THEOLOGY

VOL. XLIII SEPTEMBER, 1941 No. 255

EDITORIAL

THE question of reprisals is one that must continue to exercise the Christian conscience, however unlikely it may seem that our conclusions will have any immediate practical effect on public policy. We must think and speak of righteousness and judgment, " whether they will hear or whether they will forbear ". Total war has some of its most ravaging effects in the field of moral discrimination. When it is extremely difficult to draw a clear line between right and wrong, there is a strong temptation not to draw a line anywhere, whereas in fact it is all the more important to draw a line somewhere. If moral indifference or nihilism is admitted at one point, it will surely tend to assert itself at others, and we shall find ourselves upon a slippery slope. That, in the case of reprisals, this danger is not purely hypothetical may be inferred from the following opinions which have been publicly expressed, and it should be remarked that one of them is taken from an organ of pacifism, which shows that extremes may meet where the descent begins.

With whole nations at war civilians must share in the suffering. The more the German public realize the strength of our attack, the better for our cause. We cannot, even as Christians, distinguish between the right use of force in personal and national defence and the duty of bringing home to the enemy the false grounds on which they rely to continue their murderous attacks —their anti-Christian enterprise. (Sir Francis Fremantle, letter to *The Times*, September 19, 1940.)

Some of your correspondents . . . overlook the fact that there are no German civilians. According to Nazi philosophy, all Germans, men, women, and children, belong, body and soul, to the State machinery alike for war and for peace. The only civilians in Germany are in the concentration camps and prisons. (George Sampson, letter to *The Times*, September 27, 1940.)

We have always maintained that the question of reprisals is not a moral issue. (Leading article, *Daily Telegraph*, October 18, 1940.)

The traditional conception of a reprisal, as something morally reprehensible, is irrelevant to total war. It can have validity only in the few provinces of modern war where the " totality " has not yet penetrated—for example, in the treatment of prisoners of war. (" Observer " in *Peace News*, October 18, 1940.)

This is war, and to bomb the enemy civilians is no more brutal than to starve them. (J. E. T. Harper, letter to the *Daily Telegraph*, October 23, 1940.)

With these statements we may contrast the emphatic assertion of Bishop Hensley Henson:

I beg leave to associate myself wholeheartedly with those who hold that the policy of " reprisals " for German methods of " total war " is wrong in itself, degrading to those who adopt it, and of no practical value. It would lower our national character, conflict with our professed purpose, and, so far from arresting the horrors which are its presumed justification, would have the effect of extending and establishing them. (Letter to *The Times*, September 28, 1940.)

There are, we believe, many who would like to make this assertion their own, but who are inhibited by doubts as to whether it admits of reasonable justification. Those who are thus perplexed (as well as others) will, we think, find Mr Mortimer's discriminating essay of great value.

* * * * *

Another matter in which there is need for discrimination is in talk about " the New Order ". We are not sure who is responsible for popularizing this term. It may have been the Nazis,[1] though perhaps they took a cue from the American " New Deal ". Anyhow, it is now being used by all sorts and conditions of people, and allusions to it are liable to have a similar effect to the talk about " the war to end war " and " a land fit for heroes to live in " which became familiar last time. That at the conclusion of hostilities there will be some new form of order (unless there is sheer anarchy or disorder) may be taken for granted. Every war issues in fresh international arrangements, and in the present case rearrangements and fresh plans of vast range and influence may be anticipated. But when we are promised a New Order in capital letters, and particularly in conjunction with Christianity, we do well to ask what

[1] We observe that an article which was published in THEOLOGY in 1933 speaks of " the new order " in connexion with National Socialism as though it were an accepted expression. See vol. xxvii, pp. 243 *f.*

precisely is intended. The New Order, which Christianity promises, is the kingly rule of God. This already exists; it is the object of our faith and hope; we are called to live under its obedience now, and to look for its final manifestation when time is gathered up into eternity. It is not to be equated with any reordering of the conditions of the government of this world.

As the course of history develops there will no doubt be a whole series of new orders for better and for worse. We are certainly under an obligation to see that, so far as it lies within our power, the new order at the end of the war shall be as good and as just as possible; but recent experiences should have taught us that indulgence in too rosy or grandiose expectations may have an effect exactly contrary to what is intended. As a matter of fact, whatever public orators may say, the expectations of the masses seem on the whole to be anything but sanguine.[1] The complacent confidence of the thirties looks like passing into a resigned fatalism in the forties.

We welcome, therefore, Dr William Paton's book, *The Church and the New Order* (S.C.M. Press, 6s.). It is one of the best discussions of peace aims that we have so far come across, and it is calculated to stimulate hope on a basis of realism. For, in the first place, he recognizes that, when hostilities cease, " there is likely to be in Europe a situation of such gravity, such chaos, such bewilderment—not to use much graver terms—that the immediate tasks of policing and feeding must claim all available energy and brain " (p. 78). He reckons with " that widespread disillusionment and despair, that hate and revengefulness, that bewilderment of mind and dullness of spirit, which are all too certain to confront the builders of the new order " (p. 172). Secondly, he takes seriously the problem of power, and insists on the truth that it is idle to plan new orders or anything else unless you have, or can secure, the power to carry out your plans and are prepared to use it. Thirdly, he realizes how foolish it is to draw blue-prints with incalculable data. He sees that the most we can do at

[1] See some striking mass-observation figures in *Horizon* (July, 1941, pp. 22 *f.*). A recent survey in five London boroughs showed that 63 per cent. of the people were pessimistic in their attitude to the post-war economy, 18 per cent. optimistic, and 19 per cent. uncertain. In a badly blitzed town 78 per cent. were pessimistic and only 7 per cent. optimistic.

present is to clear and to declare our minds as to the main questions of principle that will arise, and that have indeed already arisen. Chief among these is the question whether there is an objective law of justice of universal application; and, if so, on what it is founded, what its content is, and how it may be brought to bear upon particular situations and problems. There is a growing consensus among Christian minds that here lies the fundamental question of principle, though we do not think that so much agreement in answering it has yet been reached as Dr Paton implies. He quotes with approval a saying of Sir Richard Livingstone's about the ideals of Freedom, Justice, Mercy and Truth—viz., that "the least important of these words is Freedom". But one gets the impression that for Dr Paton, or at any rate for some of the national spokesmen whose sayings he quotes with still keener approval, the *greatest* of these is Freedom.

Finally, although Dr Paton postulates the duty of striving to the utmost for the defeat of the Axis powers (and, of course, in the event of their victory we should not have much say in a new order, whatever we might think about it), yet he dissociates himself from those[1] who speak as though the survival of Christianity depended on victory in war.

[1] *E.g.*, the Bishop of Chelmsford: "We are told that this war is in defence of Christian civilization and Christian standards of life. I believe that this is true and that *if the war is lost all is lost.*" (Letter to *The Times*, October 15, 1940. Italics ours.)

Reprisals

THERE is said to be a growing demand in the country for reprisals, by which is meant in particular that the R.A.F. should bomb the larger cities of Germany with the deliberate intention of causing numerous casualties among the civilian population. When the people of Great Britain have had to endure so many hideous nights and so much suffering and loss of life, such a demand is indeed understandable. The immediate and instinctive reaction to such experiences is a desire for punishment and revenge. But, as is only natural in circumstances of such deep emotion, the demand conceals a certain confusion of thought.

It is primarily a demand to punish the Germans for their outrageous conduct, and to make the punishment so severe as to put a stop to it once and for all. It is in the second place a demand to use a particular weapon in a particular way in order to end the war as quickly as possible. There are two ethical questions involved: the first is concerned with punishment and revenge, the second with the legitimacy of killing civilians in war.

With regard to the first point, it may be said at once that while there is a place in Christian ethics for the punishment of wrong-doers, for the deliberate infliction of suffering upon them, there is no place for what we commonly understand by revenge. If punishment be inflicted solely or principally in order to damage the wrong-doer, and stops there, it is born of hate and nourishes hate, and is entirely contrary to the Christian principle of love even for one's enemy. But if the punishment be inflicted primarily to restore and vindicate justice, and also to reform the wrong-doer, or to deter him or others from further wrong-doing, then it is lawful, for it proceeds not from hate but from love of justice and our neighbour.[1] Because it is so difficult for an injured person to control his hatred and desire for revenge it is a cardinal legal maxim in all civilized countries that no man may be judge in his own cause. Civilization may be measured by the stages marking the gradual withdrawal from the private citizen of the rights of punishment or revenge and their concentration in the hands of an impartial, authoritative judiciary. Unhappily, as between two states

[1] Aquinas, *S. Th.*, II., II., Quæstio 108, art. i.

at war, there is as yet no higher impartial authority to exercise the office of judge, and each contestant must be judge in his own cause, himself to determine the justice of the punishment he inflicts upon his hated enemy, and with no check or control except the enemy's power of resistance. And when he has won the victory, he is sole arbiter and has unfettered power. But the heat of battle and the flush of victory are very unpropitious times for the exercise of impartial justice in one's own cause. Justice is only too easily the cloak of hatred, and punishment conceals revenge. For this reason during or just after war every demand for punishment—reprisals—needs very careful scrutiny lest in the measures we take we hypocritically deceive ourselves, and whilst we claim to be the avenging sword of justice are in reality only the servants of hatred and malice. In conceding this demand for the punishment of the German population we need to be very certain that the punishment does not exceed the guilt, and that we ourselves are not actuated merely by hatred.

But supposing it were true that the demand to bomb the German population proceeds only from a desire to punish their guilt justly, then a further problem arises concerning this very question of guilt. The word " reprisals " comes from the Latin *litteræ repræsaliarum* or letters of mark. If the nationals of one country inflicted damage on nationals of another country, and both themselves refused to make satisfaction and their Government when called upon to compel them to do so refused also, then letters of mark were issued to the injured parties authorizing them to seize the property of any of the nationals of the offending country, even though themselves entirely innocent, up to the amount of the loss incurred. It was a sort of private, though officially authorized, war, and the reprisals were exacted from quite innocent parties on the sole ground that they were of the same nationality as the actual wrong-doers, and members of the state made guilty by a refusal to punish the wrong-doers, and because they were able to claim compensation from their own Government. This system was fairly common in the Middle Ages, but its application was limited, at least in theory, to matters of property. During the eighteenth century, it appears, the system was extended to cover physical and bodily injuries. If the actual perpetrators say of a murder or a rape could not be discovered, or had escaped out of reach, then, by an application of the *lex*

talionis, vengeance or reprisals were taken on other, innocent, members of their country or association. One or more of them was murdered or raped, on the sole ground that they were friends or sympathizers with the actual perpetrators.

This second system of reprisals runs completely counter to the moral doctrines of the Middle Ages. Whatever may have been the theory and practice with regard to fines and other forms of punishment, both the civil and the canon law and the theologians were unanimous that corporal punishment may not be inflicted upon an innocent person in the place of the guilty.[1] For this reason it was held to be illegitimate to put hostages to death unless the hostages themselves could be shown to have some responsibility for the breach of faith which had been committed.[2] With this, I think, modern opinion is in complete agreement. There is something abhorrent in killing or beating an innocent person, solely because of his relationship with the guilty, and so making the guilty suffer through him. We should never countenance kidnapping the child of the kidnapper, nor does the alleged practice of the German Government of deterring or punishing *émigrés* by throwing their relatives into concentration camps find many defenders. This is in part because of the exquisite torture it inflicts on a man, operating on his nobler feelings and emotions, but chiefly because it rides roughshod over the just rights and claims of the innocent. It is to ignore their individuality and use them as instruments of supposed justice and levers to influence others. And there is no justice in it, for the corporal punishment which is due from a man can in the nature of things only be paid in his own person.[3]

Now in so far as the demand for reprisals is a demand for retaliatory punishment of the German raids on our cities, it raises this dilemma. If the German raids are wrong and deserve punishment, it is because civilians are outside the war, non-combatants, not responsible, or—as the medievalists put it—innocent. For the innocent are not a legitimate object of direct attack. But if British civilians, members of

[1] Aquinas, *S. Th.*, II., II., Quæstio 108, art. 4 ad sec.; Taylor, *Ductor Dubitantium*, iii, cap. 2, 11. [2] See de Victoria, *Relectiones Theologicæ*, vi, 43; Molina, *De Justitia*, Tract. ii, disp. 120; Taylor, *Ductor Dubitantium*, *ibidem*. [3] It is for this reason that any doctrine which explains the Atonement in terms of vicarious *punishment* is profoundly unsatisfactory.

a democratic country, are thus innocent—*i.e.*, not responsible either for the initiation of the war or for the manner of its conduct—then *a fortiori* German civilians living under a dictatorship are also innocent; that is, they are not responsible for these German raids. The guilty people are the German Air Force and High Command. And the demand for reprisals against the German civilian population is a demand to punish with death and wounding the innocent for the guilty. But if, on the other hand, it be maintained that the German civilian population is responsible for the war and shares the guilt of every action committed by their forces in the war, then a similar responsibility must be admitted to lie on the British civilian population. They too must be regarded as so sharing in the conduct of the war, so far to be identified with the operations of the armed forces, as themselves to be legitimate objects of attack. But in that case neither the German civil population nor anyone else has done anything wrong in the matter of air raids. On this hypothesis the Germans and we have a perfect right to bomb civilians. It is not an ethical question but a strategical one. Thus all talk of reprisals or retaliatory punishment is wholly out of place. One might as well describe the invasion of Syria as a reprisal for the invasion of Crete. It is really a matter of measure and countermeasure, attack and counter-attack.

The fundamental question, therefore, raised is that of the status of the civilian population in war. Has it any right to claim immunity from attack, or is it to be as much exposed to danger and death as are the members of the combatant services? Clearly the answer turns on whether or how far civilians are "innocent" concerning the war. But before considering that, it may be said at once, that even if they are innocent they do not enjoy complete immunity. In the first place it has always been held legitimate to kill civilians as it were accidentally;[1] that is, when the primary intention is to kill combatants, but, owing to their proximity, it is very probable that civilians will be killed too, their deaths do not constitute a crime. The classic examples are bombarding or setting fire to a besieged city or sinking a Turkish ship rowed by Christian slaves. The consequent deaths of civilians or innocent slaves are

[1] Using "accidental" in the technical sense of a secondary, incidental, even if inevitable, consequence of an action, as contrasted with the primary, main, or intended consequence of the action.

not the intention or cause of the action, but an accidental, if inevitable, consequence of the perfectly legitimate attack on the enemy's armed forces. The reason is that otherwise a just war against the guilty could never be carried on, and the guilty would always win by the simple expedient of including some civilians among their armies. The parallel between this and an air raid which has as its primary object the destruction of a munitions factory or a railway seems complete. No blame rests on the raiders if, owing to the close proximity of civilians to military targets, some get killed by bombs not quite accurately aimed.

In the second place it was the medieval doctrine that the immunity from direct attack which the innocent enjoyed in their persons did not extend to their property. It was legitimate to ravage the country and seize arms, ships, money, corn, horses, or anything which the enemy could use for his military efforts or which would help him to continue the war. The reason given for this is that if it is legitimate to kill the innocent unintentionally, as just described, when the war situation demands it, and it is judged expedient for winning the war, *a fortiori* it must be legitimate to destroy their property, if it is necessary for victory, and so to deprive the enemy of the source of supply.[1] The civilian population, then, no matter how much it be considered innocent, has never had the right to expect immunity from attack for its farms, shops, and factories.

But how far is the civilian population innocent? It is sometimes suggested that in the Middle Ages this was a simple question, because wars were conducted only by princes and volunteer armies, and a line could easily be drawn between combatants and non-combatants, and the latter regarded as innocent; but that now it is much more complicated and difficult because of the growth of industry, which turns almost everyone into a producing agent for the war effort, and because everyone has a vote and some influence and responsibility for foreign policy. But the medievalists did not find the problem absolutely simple. They seem to have determined that children must certainly be regarded as innocent. They neither willed the war, nor help it, nor indeed are mature enough to be held responsible for their actions, most of which are performed out of obedience to their elders. I do not suppose that many people nowadays will

[1] de Victoria, *op. cit.*, 39; Molina, *op. cit.*, ii, disp. 121.

wish to quarrel with that decision. Children, at any rate young children, may properly be regarded as outside the war, and should never be the object of direct attack. If it should be argued that German children are tainted and corrupted by their environment, and will, if they survive, only follow in the footsteps of their fathers, and therefore they should not be spared, this is no new and modern argument. The answer to it given in the sixteenth century was that—(1) you may not do evil that good may come, (2) it is not right to punish a sin which is only feared but not yet committed, (3) there are many other ways of preventing the children doing mischief when they grow up.[1]

To children were added women, though with less certainty. They are to be presumed innocent, unless the contrary is proved. It is not likely that they have any hand in the war. And this is true even of Turks and infidels. But if they are actually with the army, and assisting the soldiers, it is lawful to kill them. And so also with civilians generally: they are to be presumed innocent, at least if they are Christians. But if they are infidels their hostility and general ill-will make the presumption more difficult. The criterion seems to have been two-fold: first, has the civilian actually fought, or at least accompanied the army? second, is he a supporter of the war and of the general policy and outlook which produced the war? The general presumption is that those who accompany the army, and those who, like Turks and infidels, have a persistent hostility to Catholics, are not innocent. Ordinary civilians, and for the most part women, pursuing quietly their peaceable trades, are presumed to be free of any complicity in the war. The fact that the farmer sold his corn to the army or the farrier shod their horses did not, I think, suffice to destroy this presumption. And so long as this presumption held, a general direct attack on civilians was wrong.

What is the position to-day? It is certainly true that owing to industrialization the greater part of the civilian population is actively engaged in supplying munitions and resources of war. The factories are as essential an element in the structure of a nation at war as are the armed forces; indeed the latter without factories are doomed to destruction. In consequence a state at war tends to offer or allow no form of employment which does not contribute to the war

[1] de Victoria, *op. cit.*, 38. He is speaking of Saracens.

effort; all the powers of its industry are concentrated towards a single end. It is also true that owing to the growth of national feeling, and to the power of the press to create or influence public opinion, very few of the civilian population can be presumed to be indifferent to the war, still less hostile to it. On these grounds there is a strong argument for regarding the civil population—at least the adult civil population—as actively engaged in and actively supporting the war, and therefore as legitimate objects of direct attack.

Against this argument may be set these considerations. First, the average civilian is offered little if any choice in the matter of his employment. It is not his fault that his labour is devoted to supplying the armed forces, for he must work to live, and there is no other work available. Second, the very power of the press to influence opinion makes the forming of a private judgment all the more difficult. By the withholding of information, and ceaseless "propaganda" the civilians are rendered incapable of forming any other judgment than that the war is a just one and ought to be supported. They are in a position of "invincible ignorance". On the evidence before them, and in the circumstances by which they were surrounded, they could have come to no other conclusion than that which they now hold. Indeed, the same may be said of the combatants. The main guilt of war very rarely lies at the door of the common man. But if in view of these two considerations it is clear that it would be very unjust to punish the civilians or combatants for their part in the war, when the war was over, while the war is still on, any action taken against either cannot be dictated by their guilt, but only by the necessity in self-defence of weakening or destroying their contribution to the enemy's strength.

And this introduces a third consideration which should restrain direct attacks on civilians. The object of a just war is to destroy the aggressive power of the enemy, to establish and maintain peace, and to prevent or redress injustice. Every just war is at bottom a defensive war, to ward off unjust aggression. But in defence, public as well as private, it is legitimate to use only as much force as is necessary for one's object, and no more.[1] Destruction for destruction's sake, killing for the sake of killing, is no more lawful in war than in peace. In the case of the armed forces of the enemy

[1] Aquinas, *S. Th.*, II., II., Quæstio 64, art. vii.

actively fighting, it is an unavoidable necessity of self-defence to kill. But with civilians, although their contribution to the unjust aggression may be just as important and dangerous as the soldiers', killing is not, or not often, a necessity. Indeed, on the contrary, it may involve a hampering diversion of effort. The armed aggressive might of the enemy depends not so much on the lives of the civilians as on their work in the factories. And that work can be hampered and weakened as effectively, perhaps more effectively, by destruction of the factories than by killing. To prevent the civilians from working it is not necessary to kill them; what is necessary is to deprive them of their means of labour. Direct attack on the factories therefore is legitimate, but not on the civilians who work in them; though if in the process of attacking the factories some civilians are killed, that is not blameworthy, for their deaths were not the primary intention of the attack, but an unavoidable accidental consequence of it.

It is, however, often argued that by direct attack on the civilian population their will to resist may be quickly broken and the whole war then brought to an end. If this were indubitably certain I should be bound to agree that, with the whole civilian population in some degree guilty of the war, the widespread death and destruction would be justifiable. But it would have to be certain that it would end the war, and end it more quickly than could be done by any other means. And even then, owing to the legacy of hate which such a course of action must leave behind it, its wisdom would be questionable; for if one object is attained, the end of war, yet the other—the establishment of just and lasting peace—is made more difficult. But up till now there is no evidence to support the assumption. Indeed the evidence points the other way. The effect upon civilian moral in Britain of the German raids on civilians has not been, as yet, advantageous to the Germans. Quite the contrary: national unity and the will to resistance have been strengthened. The war in Holland was not brought to an end by the bombing of Rotterdam, nor in Yugoslavia by the bombing of Belgrade. The war there was ended and ended speedily by the air and land attacks on directly military objectives. The only apparent effects of the civilian bombings were to inflame hatred and perpetuate underground and guerrilla resistance. In other words, the direct attacks on civilians have proved on the whole to

fail in their object. They do not shorten the war, and they make the peace much harder to establish. But if there is thus good reason for believing that deliberate massacres of civilians are not only unnecessary but actually inexpedient, there can be no justification for such senseless destruction.

The demand, then, that the R.A.F. change its present practice of bombing factories, harbours, and railways, for an indiscriminate attack upon civilians, put forward as a demand for reprisals, is misleading and out of place. If it is proposed as a piece of strategy, though it can show some grounds of justification, it should nevertheless be refused for these reasons: (1) At least the children among civilians must be regarded as immune from attack. (2) The guilt of civilians does not merit such severe measures. (3) It exceeds what is necessary and therefore legitimate in war because their contribution to the war effort can be checked equally well by the destruction of factories. (4) The course proposed is probably inexpedient, as a means of shortening the war, and certainly so with regard to the promotion of peace and concord after the war.

ROBERT MORTIMER.

On the Sanctissimum: With an Epilogue[1]

I

VIBRATION in vibration; all desire
Mingles with That which wrought the primal clay,
And, by new intervention, from decay
Redeemed it in a work of blood and fire;
This is none other than the work—His Ire,
His Mercy, His Achievement; to that day
He hath assumed, from ages far away,
All mysteries wherethrough our souls retire
Into His central operation; now
We plunge into His being, and are one
With the earthquake and the darkening of the sun.
Vibration in vibration, we are Thou;
This is Good Friday, this the piercing sword;
Time dies; we are, where all things are restored.

[1] These sonnets were written some time ago, as will be obvious from the allusions and from the style. But nothing would be gained by attempting to bring them up to date.—C. W.

II

This is the gateway of withdrawal: see,
  The sacred gifts, to the awakening soul,
  Opens on Him who opens on the whole.
The Ideas which are His nature, yet not He,
Receive it to their convoy, Liberty,
  Truth, Beauty, Justice: the long-dangerous shoal
  Of fear is rounded; in these skies the Pole
Unclouded shines; all's happy and all's free.
This is the gateway of withdrawal; here
  All memories conjoin in memory
  Of our First Cause and deep antiquity
Of union; here, though all souls otherwhere
  Commune, is separation; the First Cause
  Each lonely to Its loneliness indraws.

III

What invoked power constrains me and compels?
  These few devout? They; but what more behind?
  The all of Christendom, through the world inclined
Breathless in near approach? They; and who else?
The world which, oft constrained to wisdom, quells
  Vociferously its heavenward-fated mind,
  Here loosed to prophecy? not all mankind
So swiftly moves, so certainly foretells
The end whereto its awful Motion yearns
  As here that Motion of itself concludes
    Its august business of creation, conned
    Dimly in all Its creatures; now beyond
  All images and all similitudes
God to His origin in God returns.

IV

"I am Necessity; I am the Power
  Whereto the gods veil their dread looks and rise
  In mute obedience; I am that which cries
Their doom through all things in their earliest hour;
Without whom no bird falls, nor any flower
  Withers; beyond whose changing prophecies
  No seer can gaze—the blinder, the more wise—
Even from Imagination's topmost tower.

One thing alone, but whether joy or woe
He finds who finds it, wheresoe'er ye go
Darkling I offer; darkling set man free,
No wise to do, but in his depths to know
Me in my nature, and himself with me
One, and to love the things that needs must be."

V

" I am the Irony which is the end
Of all discovery of the world's illusion,
The treachery, the putting to confusion
Of all things, the false hope whereto they tend:
I am the flaw which no perceptions mend,
The advent of immortal substitution;
Joy's disappointment, yet joy's sure collusion
With fear and ruin befalling to befriend.
I am the night in dawn, the dawn in night,
Perspective that destroys truth while it gives,
The longer road that is the shorter way;
And in all these I am the last delight
Which, seized, draws virtue out of all that lives,
The night in noon, in the midnight the day."

VI

" I am Annihilation; I am Peace;
Die to the universe, and lo in me
Is all perfection of tranquillity;
This is the second death; this is to cease
From conscious servitude and willed increase,
Heaving ambition whose indignant sea
Makes chaos of the world—these if ye flee
I am your utter naughting and release.
Many strong heroes ride upon my quest.
But also ye who have no heart for strife
Know, on my darkness breaks no farther day;
I am repose; I am the eternal rest
Whom not to know is everlasting life
In fear and hate and anger and dismay."

EPILOGUE

I

She, my best neighbour, being too sick and pale
  To spare my useless presence from her side,
  Yet sleeping for a while near breakfast-tide,
Loosed me to make my movements of avail
For satisfaction; in that happy jail
  I turned to see what sanctuaries abide
  Most like the Mysteries on this morn denied
To my intent; and lo, He does not fail,
Nourishing Love, in all things understood,
  Who now Himself ordains me and commands
To sacred rites; above this common food
  I sign the cross with consecrating hands:
Breathe forth, O lips—O heart, behold thy rest !—
Hoc corpus meum, hic sanguis meus est.

II

" Darling, I think the cake looks better there;
  And one cup yet is left without a spoon."
  " I see by the papers that this afternoon
Yorkshire beat Kent with sixty-three to spare;
Also that Tutankhamen's tomb is bare."
  " Yes ? It's just eight; I hope they'll be here soon."
  " Look, look — the window's open — the young moon ! . . .
Does it matter if I disarrange your hair ?"
Adored be the Identity of Joy
Without surcease, without decrease or cloy,
  Which is Eternal Being, in each fair
Imagination, of that joy the thrall:
  Who hath, as the wise doctor said, all where
His centre, his circumference not at all.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

Confirmation

MANY years ago Dr Westcott said to Dr Chase[1]: " If Confirmation had always been properly understood, many of the controversies about Baptism would never have arisen." This is profoundly true, and as it is high time for us

[1] See his *Confirmation in the Apostolic Age* (1909), preface.

to concentrate our attention on Baptism, it is important to stress the fact that it cannot be profitably considered apart from Confirmation. That was the real reason why the so-called Gorham controversy of the nineteenth century was so dreary, stale, flat, and unprofitable, and every effort should be made to avoid its repetition. For not only have Baptism and Confirmation been administered in close succession in the East from early days to the present time, and in the West up to about A.D. 450 at least, but in all correct theological formulation the two sacraments—for so Cyprian (Ep. lxxii, 2) calls them—have been carefully distinguished.

Of course, it is possible by careful selection of patristic passages to prove the contrary, just as by a careful choice of biblical texts one can prove many monstrosities (it took me nearly two days to elucidate the thought of Cyprian after it had been obscured by the quotations of the zealous Dr Wirgman in his desire to refute Canon Mason); but if anyone will take the trouble to read the Fathers *in extenso* he will certainly corroborate what is here affirmed.

Naturally with rites so closely associated there cannot but be sometimes loose and inaccurate expressions. Thus Jerome (*Contra Lucifer* IV) says: "Sacerdotium laici, id est Baptisma"; but of course he means Confirmation, and no one can mistake his meaning. When Cyprian says (Ep. lxxiv, 7), "Baptisma esse sine Spiritu non potest," he means that the second spiritual birth can only take place within the Catholic Church; and when (Ep. lxiii, 5) he says, "Per Baptisma Spiritus sanctus accipitur," he means by "baptisma" Baptism and Confirmation, and goes on to state the indispensable connexion of the series—Baptism, Confirmation, and reception of the Eucharist. Nor has he forgotten that he has said (Ep. lxxiv, 6), "There is an imposition of the hand on the baptized that we may receive the Holy Spirit"; nor (*ib.* 8), "A man is not born, when he receives the Holy Spirit by the imposition of the hand, but in baptism, in order that *after* he has been born he may receive the Holy Spirit. This is what happened in Adam's case: first God created him, and then breathed into his face the breath of life." Nor (Ep. lxxiii, 9), "This" (that happened in Samaria) "happens now with us. Those who are baptized in the Church are presented to the heads (*præpositi*) of the Church, and by our prayer and hand-imposition receive the Holy Spirit, and are perfected with

the Lord's seal." Nor (Ep. lxxii, 1), "It is not enough to give imposition of the hand for receiving the Holy Spirit (to returning heretics and schismatics) unless they *also* receive the Church's baptism. For they can only be fully sanctified and be sons of God if they are born by both sacraments, since it is written, 'unless a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God'."

From this last quotation it is plain that Cyprian in St John iii, 5, understood *aqua* to refer to Baptism, the Spirit to Confirmation. If I may refer to myself for a moment, when the possibility of this exegesis first occurred to me I felt I was alone and very venturesome. Presently I discovered it was the view of Bp Jeremy Taylor (*A Discourse of Confirmation*, p. 23): "unless a man be baptized into Christ, and confirmed by the Spirit of Christ, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of Christ." Tertullian (*De Baptismo*, 12) must have agreed with Cyprian, for he inaccurately quotes, "Nisi natus ex aqua quis fuerit, non habet uitam." (Here let me say that it is to me a strange perversity to translate Titus iii, 5, "Through the washing of regeneration and the washing of renewal of the Holy Spirit." "Washing of renewal" is barely intelligible. It is surely "washing of regeneration," Baptism, and "renewal of the Holy Spirit," Confirmation.) The reading of this treatise of Tertullian (from his Catholic period) would be illuminating to anyone who wants to know the faith and practice of *c.* A.D. 200. He begins with the praise of water, and says the same Holy Spirit which moved over the waters in Creation is present in the same way over the waters of the font. The use of water in cleansing the body is a type of its spiritual use in cleansing the soul. In the 1928 Prayer Book the heading of one section, "The blessing of the water", emphasizes the doctrine of Tertullian, constantly reformulated later. Moreover, that *aqua* is repeatedly used as a synonym of Baptism can be shown by reference to Tertullian, *De Bapt.* 20; Cyprian, Ep. lxxiii, 6 ("Baptism has always been signified by the appellation of water"); Origen, *In Joann.* vi, 17; (Ambrose), *De Sacr.* iii, 2; Cyr. Jer., *Catech.* iii, 10; Augustine, *Sermo* 227.

To the two functions of Baptism—viz., the remission of sins and the second spiritual birth—careful writers add nothing. Cyril of Jerusalem (*Catech.* xx, 6) does, however, say in his lecture on Baptism, "as it is purificatory of sins

and productive (*proxenon*) of a gift of Holy Spirit, so also it is a figure of the sufferings of Christ." It is, however, abundantly clear that he regards Chrism as giving more, for (xxi, 3 *on Chrism*) he says: " As the bread of the Eucharist after the Epiklesis of the Holy Spirit is no longer simple bread but the Body of Christ, so also this Chrism is no longer plain or common after Epiklesis, but a gift of Christ and by the presence of His Divinity operative of the Holy Spirit." In the first quotation it is tolerably clear that Cyril only meant to maintain a connexion of the Holy Spirit with Baptism, as we all must, for anyhow Baptism puts the child in touch with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: Origen says (*In Joann.* vi, 17), " Baptism is the beginning and fountain head of divine gifts." But that the full gift of the sevenfold graces of the Holy Spirit comes, not in Baptism, but in Confirmation is the view of East and West alike (it is a mere detail that the East emphasizes Chrism as the matter of the sacrament, the West more commonly hand-imposition). Fortunately, this is still preserved for us in our office of Confirmation. From Irenæus (*Haer.* iv, 30), who says, " Those on whom the Apostles laid hands received the Holy Spirit," to Augustine, who says (*Serm.* 272), " When you were baptized, you were sprinkled: when you received the fire of the Holy Spirit, you were as it were baked," references could be multiplied. More revealing are those given by the way—*e.g.*, Pope Cornelius (A.D. 251-2) saying of Novatus, " He only had a clinical Baptism: he was never sealed by the Bishop. Without these additions how could he have got (*etuchen*) the Holy Spirit?" The Council of Arles (Canon 6) says that, if a man has been once baptized in the names of the Trinity he should only receive imposition of hand, that he may receive the Holy Spirit. Equally important is the language of Church formulas. The *Euchologion* has as words spoken after signing with Chrism, " The seal of the gift of the Holy Spirit." Mr Thompson (*Offices of Baptism and Confirmation*, p. 222) says that the Roman (Gelasian and Gregorian), Greek, Gallican, and Egyptian sacramentaries connect the gift of the Holy Spirit with post-baptismal unction, and only the Syrian and Armenian with unction at baptism. We can hardly hesitate with which group to ally ourselves. Bishop Hall in his book *Confirmation* (p. 87) sums up as follows: " I am convinced that, amid whatever apparent inconsistencies, early Christian writers, when they face the question of the

characteristic gifts of Baptism and of Confirmation, attribute to the latter the gift of the indwelling of the Spirit of God." Confirmation, then, or being confirmed ("ratify and confirm", 1552, may have been only a misprint for "ratify and confess", though even Bp Cosin, Works, v, 487, said that the name came from the ratification of the profession), is not a subjective but an objective thing. The verb (probably derived from 2 Cor. i, 21) was first used by St Leo the Great in A.D. 458 (Ep. 159, 7), after which the name became common, and doubtless suggested to Peter Lombard his *gratia roboris*, "grace of strength". When Aquinas added to this the *gratia augmenti*, he did not mean "addition" but "growth", a very different thing.

Unfortunately, for different reasons different people have tended to depreciate Confirmation. Jerome (*Contra Lucifer* 9), who was inclined to reserve only ordination for bishops, regarded it as little more than an extra honour to the episcopal office, and a very inconvenient one for people living in remote places. Augustine said (*De Bapt.* iii, 16, 21), "hand-imposition was only after all a prayer over a man, and could be repeated." The seventeenth-century English Jesuits, according to Bishop Taylor, acting as usual on their policy of magnifying the Papacy at the expense of the Episcopate, said it was unnecessary. Newman (*Justification*, p. 153) said it was "the mere completion of Baptism". The general Latin view has been that it is not necessary to salvation, but is binding on all who would obey the Church. Contemporary Anglican writers say as little about it as they can—*e.g.*, Bishop Headlam and Dr Quick, who in *Doctrines of the Creed* does not, I believe I am correct in saying, mention it.

The time has now come for us to put it in the front of our teaching. For—(1) No rite has a more definite Scriptural basis. St Luke (if it be he, and remember that those who feel bound to think the Acts a compilation by someone else after A.D. 95 do at least help to illuminate the dark tunnel that leads from sub-apostolic times to the full light of Tertullian) takes the greatest pains by his choice of instances to show that the rite could not be performed by a deacon but by apostles only, that it was performed at Ephesus by the apostle of the Gentiles as well as at Samaria by the apostles of the Circumcision with similar results, that God was not tied to this rite (Cæsarea and Damascus), that supernatural phenomena (glossolalia, prophecy, etc.)

were sometimes but not always its accompaniments. The *Auctor ad Hebræos* describes teaching about baptisms (possibly the plural refers to the difference between the baptism of John and that of the apostles) and Confirmation (hand-imposition) as an elementary instruction of a catechumen. We need not consider whether it is valid when not performed by a bishop, unless we wish to offend the whole Orthodox Church; it is enough for us that it is with us episcopally administered and we do not want a change. It is very interesting that Richard Baxter (*Confirmation and Restauration*, Works, xiv, 401-594) argued in favour of the universal reintroduction of the rite when wanting. (2) The other great reason for emphasizing Confirmation is that it is not primarily the reaffirmation of baptismal vows, but, as Jerome and many other Fathers said, the ordination of the layman. By virtue of this ordination at Confirmation the whole ordained body corporately offers the Eucharist, and completes the Eucharistic Offering by communicating. Similarly at a public baptism they as a body receive the child into the congregation of Christ's Church. In each case the priest is their mouthpiece. Confirmation also authorizes the layman henceforward to perform (in cases of necessity and in the absence of a priest) clerical functions. Obviously this most commonly applies to Baptism only, but in many other cases a layman might take the place of an absent priest—*e.g.*, in reading the Burial service; his right to read the liturgical epistle has recently been vindicated. The laity as a rule do not understand what St Peter means by calling them "an holy nation, a royal priesthood". Let them be often reminded of it and live up to their high calling.

Let me conclude with a quotation from Hooker (*Eccl. Pol.* v, 66): "After the Ascension of our Lord that which he had begun continued in the daily practice of the apostles, whose prayer and imposition of hands were a means whereby thousands became partakers of the wonderful gifts of God. . . . The fathers everywhere impute unto it that gift or grace of the Holy Spirit, not that which maketh first Christian men, but when we are made such, assisteth us in all that armeth against temptation and sin. . . . The fathers being thus persuaded, hold Confirmation as an ordinance apostolic, always profitable in God's Church though not always with equal largeness of the external effects, which gave it countenance at first. . . . Our

warrant for the good effect thereof is the same which Patriarchs, Prophets, Priests, Apostles, Fathers and Men of God have had for such their particular Invocations, and Benedictions, as no man, I suppose, professing the truth of Religion will easily think to have been without fruit. No, there is no cause we should doubt of the benefit, but surely great cause to make complaint of the deep neglect of this Christian *duty*, almost with all those to whom by right of their place and calling, the same belongeth. Let them not take it in evil part, the thing is true, their small regard hereunto hath done harm in the Church of God."

G. C. Richards.

Gilbert Keith Chesterton

II—The Response of G. K. C.

The fundamental basis of Chesterton's reaction to the political, economic, and cultural lunacy whose characteristics we have investigated in relation to Chesterton's education was theological. It was not theological in the sense that it was academic but in the sense that it was theocentric and popular. Herein lay its real importance. It is obvious that an analysis of Chesterton's theology is impossible within the scope of a short essay, but the main points in his theology can be indicated. Chesterton's theology was primarily popular and basic; the features which we associate with it, the political and economic facets, were of secondary importance. Chesterton resurrected the dignity of man by referring to the historicity of the Incarnation. This was true Christian humanism as opposed to anarchic liberalism and false totalitarianism. Thus " it is thanks to the lobs and yorkers and full pitchers of Chestertonian apologetic that it is intellectually respectable to-day to call yourself a Christian,"[1] an exaggerated statement with a firm foundation of truth in it.

By 1908 Chesterton had laid down the principles by which life should be ruled in precise, vigorous, sometimes paradoxical language. He at least " read things in black and white and saw life as the battlefield it is ", but his opponents

[1] *Theology*, xxxv, 135.

" are unhappy because " they " disbelieve in evil, and think it philosophical to see everything in the same light of grey." Grey and pink were the two colours which he could least appreciate, for they seemed to present so sickly a contrast to the gorgeous reds and golds which first became prominent on the banners of London's suburbs in *The Napoleon of Notting Hill*. Christianity had a certainty, an authority, which its opponents lacked. In *Orthodoxy* Chesterton refers to the various and contradictory accusations levelled against Christianity as well as to the contempt with which it was regarded. That this contempt has partly vanished is in some ways due to Chesterton. Even the economic, mental, and spiritual paralysis of the modern world cannot conceal the great change that has taken place in the affirmation of faith. It is true to say that the very growth of Communism and Fascism reveals a religious need, while, although a very great deal, an overwhelming amount, remains to be done, there are certain indications that the tide may be on the turn. " Religion ", said Chesterton, " has returned; because all the various forms of scepticism that tried to take its place and do its work have by this time tied themselves into such knots that they cannot do anything." Religion, perhaps, has returned, but as yet the Christian religion still needs a tonic. Chesterton believed rightly or wrongly that the " certainty " of Christianity provides one of its surest foundations.

His interpretation of Christianity is in reality a summary of his life's work from the day of his birth in the shadow of the Water-Tower to the day of his requiem in Westminster Cathedral. " All roads ", he remarked many times, " lead to Rome." Better still, all roads, the rolling road, the narrow paths of literary criticism, and the sweeping carriage drives of *G.K.'s Weekly*, led to the philosophy of Christianity. " A wind sprang up in the west, like a wave of unreasonable happiness, and tore eastward across England, trailing with it the frosty scent of forests and the cold intoxication of the sea. In a million holes and corners it refreshed men like a flagon and astonished them like a blow," and the wind was the spirit of gold-bright Chesterton[1] sweeping his adversaries from the path.

[1] " Gilbert, I supposed heretofore to signifie gold-like bright. But because it is written in Doomsday booke, Gislebert, I judge it to signifie brave or bright pledge." (William Camden.)

Yet his life was bounded by reason. If Christianity was certain it was because creation was equally certain. Creation is one of the salient features in Chesterton's popular theology:

> The vision of a haloed host
> That weep around an empty throne;
> And, aureoles dark and angels dead,
> Man with his own life stands alone.
>
> " I am " he says with bankrupt creed;
> " I am " and is again a clod:
> The sparrow starts, the grasses stir,
> For he has said the name of God.[1]

" So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." " A philosophy begins with being; with the end and value of a living thing; and it is manifest that a materialism that only considers economic ethics cannot cover the question at all."[2] Chesterton's work then lays immense stress on *genesis* or creation, and in one of his best works, *The Everlasting Man*, he emphasizes this primal act at the very beginning, " not the scientific growth from a small shell fish to a ponderous and ungainly cave man, but of man, male and female."[3] Chesterton, in popular and not always very precise language, was stressing then the very subject which the greatest theologians had repeatedly affirmed to be the beginning of all things. " We have", said St Thomas Aquinas, " to think not only of the emanation of some particular being but also the emanation of the whole of being from a universal cause, which is God, and it is this emanation which we call by the name of creation."[4] So too Chesterton. " I had always believed that the world involved magic: now I thought that perhaps it involved a magician",[5] and later he continues, " the universe is a single jewel, and while it is natural cant to talk of a jewel as peerless and priceless it is literally true. . . . This in some dark way I thought before I could write, and felt before I could think. There was something personal in the world as in a work of art."[6] His whole life was to be concerned with this fact of creation, not the whim of a despot but a voluntary act proceeding from the abundant goodness of God, a being

[1] *Collected Poems*, 324. [2] *Well and Shadows*, 120. [3] *Everlasting Man*, 13. [4] *Summa Theologica*, Ia, Quæstio 85, art. 1. [5] *Orthodoxy*, 108. [6] *Id.* 115-6.

pre-existent to the fact of creation. A flower, a dandelion lying yellow in the meadow, a lily splendid and dignified, were all as symbolic of the first act as man himself.

If creation, on the one hand, revealed God in all His majesty, it was equally affirmative of the dignity of man. " It was the problem of how men could be made to realize the wonder and splendour of being alive, in environments which their own daily criticism treated as dead alive, and which their imagination had left for dead." Further, Chesterton places the fact of the constant and universal being of God against the fantastic materialism of the early decades of the century whose importance as a starting-point for his thought I have already discussed. Christianity, its opponents taught, " had apparently a mystical talent for combining vices which seemed inconsistent with each other."[1] Thus it was attacked for its optimism and for its riches and its poverty, its pacifism and its militarism, for its sackcloth and dried peas, for its shrines of porphyry and its robes of gold. So he came to the Christian revelation of God, the splendour and humanity of the Incarnation, not exactly as Father Michael clutching the Cross but as Adam Wayne, triumphant over his enemies, envisaging the Christ as the Church militant, as man triumphant, not as the meek and mild shepherd of the Victorian sentimentalists.

> Now let all nations climb and crawl and pray
> Though I be basest of my old red clan,
> They shall not scale, with cries or sacrifice,
> The stature of a spirit of man.

" Man was a statue of God walking about the garden. . . . Man was to tread the earth as if to subdue it. Christianity thus held a thought of the dignity of man that could only be expressed in crowns that rayed like fans of peacock plumage." Chesterton believed that the mechanism and materialism of his age had thus stifled man's belief in himself and as a consequence man's belief in God. It was incidentally his reaction from this, the desire for authority and discipline, which finally led him to Rome. Our attitude to life, he said, is best expressed in " terms of a kind of military loyalty " rather than " in terms of criticism and approval ". Thus it was but a short step from the praise of God to the self-respect and dignity of man. The factor that militated

[1] *Orthodoxy*, 153.

against this was best comprehended under the title sin. Sin was the weapon that prevented man's fulfilment of his own end, the scar of the primal innocence. Did not man, he asked, in the morning of the world draw reindeers on the cave's walls and was he not shaken with that beautiful madness called laughter " as if he had caught sight of some secret in the very shape of the universe hidden from the universe itself"?[1] For just as man is the microcosm of God, so is the love of God translated into every healthy and joyful experience. Dickens' appreciation of joy, evidenced for instance in the *Christmas Carol*, is in many respects the impulse which drew Chesterton towards a literary appreciation of that writer. This joy found its emanation in small and trivial things—the pulling of the Christmas cracker and the brandy burning bright—but it was none the less fundamental to the philosophy of life, found its fulfilment in the Child of Bethlehem. " The young man ", he remarks elsewhere, " pulling on his gloves is quite as elemental a figure as an anchorite." " Mr Swinburne does not hang up his stocking on the birthday of Victor Hugo. Mr William Archer does not sing carols descriptive of the birth of Ibsen outside people's doors in the snow." No, he replied, they had no principle, no thought of the dignity of man, the meaning of the Crucifix, the goodness of creation.

From these principles, popular in form if fundamental in essence, the being of God, the creation of man, the barrier of sin, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ and in His Catholic Church, Chesterton deduced the politico-theological ideas which run like a thread through all his books. These ideas are, however, less satisfactory than the principles from which they flow. It is the principles, the return to Christianity, rather than the facets of the Chestertonian jewel which give him his place in history. Distributism, his ideas on eugenics and history, the material which occupies the greater part of his apologetic, have only an ephemeral importance. They have indeed led many writers to underestimate and misunderstand Chesterton altogether.

An analysis then of G. K. Chesterton is significant for two reasons, both of them characteristic of other figures in the twentieth century but never embodied in so picturesque or so attractive a personality. In the first place Chesterton's " rebellion " was primary. It marked the turn of the tide,

[1] *Everlasting Man*, 35.

the realization that liberal and scientific man had " missed the bus ". The fact that his " rebellion " was embodied in popular literature and paradox does not make it the less important. In the second place Chesterton's recoil sent him to fundamentals, to the creation and to God, to the Incarnation and the true dignity of man. The man and the woman were given their proper appreciation in a world singularly bereft of dignity or rational thought. In conclusion, then, it is true to say that Chesterton's work contains a reaction to a godless materialism and an emphasis on Christian humanism which we associate to-day with such significant thinkers as Nicholas Berdyaev and Jacques Maritain. By one of those paradoxes of history which he loved so well G. K. Chesterton may be remembered in the twentieth century for his essays and in the twenty-first century for his popular theology, the vanguard to the return of Christianity.

> Yea, for one great hour's triumph not in me
> Nor any hope of mine did I rejoice,
> But in a meadow game of girls and boys
> Some sunset in the centuries to be.

V. H. H. Green.

(*Concluded.*)

A Plea for Humanists

One has noticed of late a tendency to depreciate by misuse the good term Humanism; but by condoning such misuse we are making a present to the enemy. The term is now too commonly used as a synonym for paganism, and it is suggested, if not stated, that Humanism and the Christian faith are mutually incompatible. There could be no greater or more disastrous error.

The identification with paganism is doubtless due to the association of Renaissance humanism with the " re-discovery " of Greek and the plunge of some over-enthusiastic Italians into revivalist Hellenism. But Colet, More, and Erasmus were leading humanists and yet remained catholic Christians, who, if they had had their way, might have reformed the Church without disrupting it, which would have made all the difference to European civilization. That,

however, is an historical question with which we are not here concerned; the point we wish to make is what ought to be the quite obvious one, that modern paganism is not humanist at all, but the very antithesis of it.

We may take some of the points characteristic of modern paganism and contrast them with the traditional humanist outlook. (*a*) For modern scientific paganism the individual human being is not an individual, but either a cog in a machine or a unit in a mass of similar units. For the humanist, on the other hand, the individual man is a unique creature, a being interesting and valuable for his own sake. (*b*) Modern paganism both in theory and practice can allow the individual no personal freedom. Theoretically it is materialist, and so excludes the possibility of personal freedom; practically it subjects men to an increasing standardization of ideas, beliefs, occupations, amusements, behaviour—even of appearance, so that modern megalopolitan man approximates more and more to a mechanism. Man's reactions to the standardized stimuli he is continually receiving are becoming more and more regular. As a contrast to this, humanism has always stood for individuality and spontaneity, regarding such things as of value in themselves. (*c*) Another contrast is afforded by the fact that modern paganism is an enemy of beauty, far more so than puritanism ever was. The modern pagan destroys beauty wherever he can, not so much out of dislike of it, but out of sheer insensitiveness. How could he be expected to perceive beauty, which is an individual thing, when all individuality has been eliminated from him and the world he has created? As for creating beauty, modern paganism can create nothing but a dreary sameness. The trail of the machine is everywhere; what beauty can there be in a speed-track, a square concrete box, a line of pylons, or the average industrial district? Humanism, on the other hand, regards beauty as an absolute value, and can create it, for humanism is a human thing, which modern paganism is not. Beauty must have life in it and be the product of a being who loves what he produces. The truth is that individuality is necessary both for enjoying and creating beauty, and modern paganism is committed to a reduction of individuality to the vanishing-point.

So much perhaps will be admitted. It will be agreed that the richness of traditional humanism is to be preferred to the spiritual squalor of modern paganism. But it will

be maintained that the very eclipse of civilized humanism, and its replacement by modern uncivilized paganism, are signs of its fundamental weakness—that it over-values the individual, as modern paganism undervalues him, or else it values him in the wrong way—*i.e.*, for himself and apart from his being " a child of God and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven ". And it may be true that a humanism which rejects the Christian faith is likely to go down before the modern flood of scientific paganism if only because it lacks a theory of man tough enough to stand up as an obstacle to it. But the fact that the humanism of the enlightenment, as we may call it, is too tender a plant to withstand the sirocco of modern mechanist and materialist propaganda, does not warrant our identifying it with the paganism which swamps it. It still remains true that the humanism of the Renaissance, and that of Rousseau and the nineteenth-century liberals, was a civilized creed, and had far more in common with the Christian faith, especially in respect of the value it placed on the individual, than with modern paganism.

Indeed there is much to be said for the view that the Christian faith is the only secure and sound form of humanism. There is a widespread tendency to overlook or minimize the humanist elements in the New Testament and the teaching of the Church; this tendency is to be traced back to Otto, whose idea of the *mysterium tremendum* was the origin of Barth's regrettable and non-Christian notion of the " otherness " of God. The doctrine of the Incarnation, as expressed in the Johannine writings, involves a community of nature between man and God who made him in His own image; in fact only through community of nature can there be any intercourse with God or knowledge of Him. " To as many as received him to them gave he power to become children of God."[1] As Gerald Vann has put it, summarizing the teaching of St Thomas, " Man's fulfilment is his divinization—his becoming divine in a human mode."[2]

It may be said that the Christian faith and humanism must always be mutually incompatible because the former accepts the supremacy of the supernatural whereas the latter does not even recognize its existence. But perhaps the supernatural which humanism has rejected has been regarded as

[1] *Cf.* Gal. iii, 26: " For ye are all sons of God through faith in Jesus Christ." [2] *On Being Human*, p. 47.

separated from the natural by a gulf, and also fundamentally opposed to it—the Barthian error in another form, though of course not originating with him. But a more reasonable view, and that of the Thomist philosophy, is that the supernatural is not the contradiction of the natural, but its completion: grace perfects nature (*gratia perficit naturam*). Humanist values are not negatived by the Christian faith, but established and amplified; they are sanctioned by the supernatural (*i.e.*, by God) and find their fulfilment in the wider range supplied by the supernatural.

But the most frequently emphasized contrast between the Christian faith and humanism is that, while the former is "other-worldly", the latter's outlook is confined to this world. It is true that humanism is interested in the beautiful world revealed to the senses, and has claimed to find sufficient in this life to satisfy reasonable human aspirations; humanism has tended too to substitute a utopia on this planet for the mansions of heaven. And doubtless there is a certain imperfection here, though so far as they go the beauty of the world and visions of utopia are not things to be despised. The Christian faith involves neither contempt for the created world, which is the work and a revelation of God, nor yet the rejection of all utopian visions for the temporal future of mankind. No small part of the greatness of St Thomas lay in the fact that he substituted the Aristotelian interest in created things for the Platonist contempt for the visible world. Gerald Vann, in the work already quoted, says that this was indeed "the central point of his innovation"; and one which met with much opposition from the camp of the ascetics, the mystics, and the fanatic theologians who despised philosophy.

> The Thomist will have no truck with a spirituality which keeps its eyes fixed on the ground lest creatures distract it. The Catholic stature is gigantic for it touches the clouds, but remains safely and solidly human for its feet are firmly planted on the earth. . . .
>
> Thomism, as much as humanism, demands a reverence for things and a love of them for their own sake.[1]

Thus science as well as art, both pursuits which humanism values, are consistent with Christian faith, which is enriched by the knowledge and insight which they bring; for man

[1] Vann, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

cannot be too alive to the wonders of creation since all redound to the glory of the Creator. Nor is it inconsistent with the Christian faith to seek to improve the material conditions of men's lives.

The Christian faith and humanism have one further very important point in common: both are enemies of superstition. It was as the conqueror of demons, evil spirits, sorcery, magic, and kindred aspects of superstition that the early Church made its way. It stood for a moral, rational, and spiritual religion in a world accustomed to obscene and superstitious cults. It may be said that modern paganism, owing so much to science, is bound to be the enemy of superstition, but this is too favourable a view to take of it. It is true that the material as well as the cultural basis of modern paganism is the product of science, but it does not follow that modern mass-man knows much of the principles or methods of science. His knowledge of science is very superficial and in intellectual problems as such he takes no interest. If he is a technician, his interest in science is purely practical, and does not extend beyond a limited area; if he is not a technician, his interest is casual and centred on some new scientific marvel, to which his attitude is not far removed from that of a medieval peasant towards a miracle-working image. The philosophy inspiring modern paganism is a raw and superficial materialism, which no one could hold who was capable of a critical examination of first principles. It is a common error to imagine that materialism is an effective antidote to superstition. Nothing could be farther from the truth; materialism provides a most fertile soil for superstitions to grow in for two reasons. The first is that materialism is an uncritical creed, and the mind which can embrace it can embrace anything; the second is that it leads ultimately (if the person holding it is capable of reflection) to scepticism, and to believe nothing is to believe everything. An additional reason is that materialism reduces everything to one level; mind, life, matter are all one. This means, ultimately, that the investment of inanimate matter with magical properties is no more unreasonable than to invest a material organism with mental or volitional properties. Materialism and magic are logically connected, since, if material things are all, there is nothing you cannot expect of them. If a man has no more spirit than a stone, a stone has as much as a man, and to use it as a mascot to bring luck is as reasonable as anything can

be. The stone may have *mana* in it, and if you carry it in your pocket it may ward off the evil eye. Belief in luck and disbelief in reason have always gone hand in hand, and quite naturally, for if there is no reason in things they are guided anyhow, which means that chance rules. Thus it is foolish to suppose that materialism is an obstacle to superstition. The only sure preventive is a rational and moral religion, because this founds belief and behaviour upon reason.

Humanism is far removed from this materialistic paganism; it exalts human values, while materialism is the negation of them all. Here humanism and the Christian faith speak with one voice, though the latter may speak with more assurance, since for it human values are guaranteed by something other than man, while for humanism man's values are only self-guaranteed.

Thus the attitude of the Christian believer towards the humanist should not be one of rejection or hostility. He should regard him as in a wholly different category from the modern pagan, whose hold on human values is being rapidly lost. The Christian believer may be convinced that the values and ideals cherished by the humanist are very insecure apart from the foundation and guarantee afforded by his own faith. But in that case the Christian believer should strive by all the means in his power to convert the humanist to his own point of view, inducing him to take that step forward which will land him on firm ground. It is a profound error both in charity and in tactics for the Christian to turn his back on the humanist or hastily to class him with the unbelieving pagan. He is the modern counterpart of those " god-fearers " who in the days of the infant Church were the most fertile soil for its propaganda. Like the young lawyer in the Gospel, they are " not far from the kingdom of God ". They should be assisted to enter, and the door not shut in their faces.

J. C. Hardwick.

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

The Rev. Robert Mortimer, B.D., is Student and Tutor of Christ Church, Oxford.

Mr Charles Williams is on the staff of the Oxford University Press, and the author of *Taliessin through Logres*, *The Descent of the Dove*, etc.

The Rev. Dr Richards was Professor of Greek and Classical Literature in the University of Durham and Canon of Durham Cathedral from 1927 to 1934.

The Rev. V. H. H. Green, who is a Fellow of St Augustine's College, Canterbury, is at present acting as Chaplain of St Luke's College, Exeter.

The Rev. J. C. Hardwick is Vicar of Partington, near Manchester.

REVISED REVIEWS—VII

Atonement and Personality. By R. C. Moberly.

This book, published in 1901, was printed ten times in the first quarter of the century. It was a theological "best seller", and its popularity is not difficult to understand. There must have been many who, like the present reviewer, read it with enthusiasm a generation ago. If lapse of time brings to some of us a revision of our first attitude, it is important that we should not underestimate the great value which the book had in its own day. Theologically our minds were shaped by it in a very marked degree; and that not so much for its theory about one particular doctrine, as because it showed us the unity of theology as a system. It taught us that we cannot hope to understand any one of the great Christian doctrines unless we see its connexion with all the rest.

Something of the kind was urgently needed at the time in English theology. There is clear evidence of this within the book itself. It was written in strong reaction from its immediate background, and in particular from the Evangelical presentation of the Atonement as represented by Dale. The whole form of Moberly's argument was determined by that fact. Partly in consequence of this the book has serious limitations which stamp it as very much a product of its own age and circumstances.

In reaction from a doctrine of penal substitution the book begins with a thesis about punishment, the true purpose of which is found to be the moral reformation of the criminal. Punishment succeeds just so far as the delinquent accepts it as a justly imposed chastisement. If this occurs it implies a change of heart. The condemned criminal has begun to be a penitent.

What was imposed from without is now accepted within the soul as a spiritually valuable discipline. The sinner has put himself on the side of the moral law. He suffers for his sin, but in a way which brings inward transformation. The purpose of punishment is that it may be " taken up into the suffering personality as penitence ". From this point the author's theory of Atonement is developed. Penitence involves the identification of the sinner with holiness. If perfected it would destroy the soul's connexion with past wrongdoing and so eliminate guilt. It would also break the power of sin by transforming the self. But all this is impossible to the sinner, precisely because he is in the toils of sin. Christ became, not the victim of punishment in our stead, but the perfect penitent on our behalf. He identified Himself with sinners in that complete obedience to righteousness and repudiation of sin which is their only way of salvation, but which the sinless alone could effect. This He could do for all men because as God incarnate He is Man in a sense unique to Himself. Though human in a completely personal way He is so " not generically, but inclusively ". That is, He can include all men in Himself and be identified with all. This identification of redeemed sinners with their Saviour is effected by the Holy Spirit in the Church and particularly through the sacraments. For the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Crucified. By dwelling in us He unites us to the life of the perfect penitent, so that the holiness and love once manifested on Calvary are now produced in us.

In all this the only unusual feature is the idea of sinless and representative penitence. Moberly found the germ of this in Macleod Campbell's book and developed it on his own lines into a more comprehensive and Catholic form. The theory does not seem to have had much influence amongst more recent writers on this subject. It has probably won less acceptance than other features contributed by Moberly such as his Christology and his doctrine of identification. On the other hand this book showed a new recognition of the solidarity of mankind; and its social illustrations of vicarious suffering were valuable and timely. Moreover, the author sought to effect a new reconciliation between " objective " and " subjective " theories. In that respect perhaps his best contribution lay in the new emphasis which he gave to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The title of the book indicates another subject which received special attention. The theme of " personality " was essentially modern; and in Moberly's pages it had more affiliation with current fashions in philosophy than with the Athanasian doctrine of man, notwithstanding the copious citations concerning the latter in the supplementary chapter.

In this last respect Moberly was pre-eminently a man of his own time. His book contains no hint of any true appreciation concerning the ancient classical doctrine of redemption, not-

withstanding the attention given to patristic writers. Those aspects of the New Testament which look in this direction are largely ignored or else treated as metaphorical, the " metaphors " being regarded as finding their *rationale* in his own theory. For example, the biblical illustrations of sin drawn from debt, sickness, and slavery are regarded as inadequate because they do not touch the central self. This is connected with a plea, in itself justified, that transactional theories have been apt to treat the sinner as a " complete and separate whole ", who can in his completeness be transferred from one state to another. " The central self is unchanged." But from another point of view it was the author of this criticism who treated the sinner too much as a " separate whole ". For he gave all too little attention to the Fall of man, that cosmic event which resulted in our present condition of debt, sickness, and slavery, and which is the pre-condition of the sinful self. From this point of view it was unfortunate that the approach was made from theories of punishment and penitence, inasmuch as it narrowed the whole argument *ab initio* to an undue concentration upon the individual personality. Further, it gave priority to the negative rather than to the positive aspects of the divine plan of creation and redemption. In all these respects Moberly failed to appreciate the differences of tone and emphasis between his own pre-occupations and the majestic passages from St Athanasius which he quotes so fully in the supplement.

The book also assumes that guilt is cancelled by perfect penitence. Have we any right to make this assumption in abstraction from other aspects of redemption ? To do so ignores the Fall, as the cosmic manifestation of sin, and the corresponding teaching about reconciliation, justification, and forgiveness. For each of these biblical concepts has a wider scope than that of restoring the individual sinner. Ἡ ἄφεσις τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν is not simply the " self-acting " of righteousness towards " the forgivable ". In the New Testament it is, as release from guilt, closely connected with a release from hostile powers which had to be effected on a cosmic scale before it could reach the individual. This can be seen, for example, from Colossians i, 13-22 and ii, 13-15. In the first of these passages the phrase in question is actually equated with " redemption " which follows upon a deliverance from " the power of darkness ". In the same passage reconciliation is declared to include the whole universe in its scope before the reconciliation of sinners is mentioned. The two statements are connected together by a description of the Mediator as Head of both creations. In the second passage forgiveness of sins is a consequence of the victory which " stripped off " the hostile powers who had settled like vultures upon the body of the Crucified.

A similar complex of ideas can be discerned in Romans, especially in the pregnant summary at the beginning of ch.

viii (vv.1-3) and in the second half of that chapter, where justification and redemption are the themes. How can this cosmic release be effected by vicarious penitence? Moreover, the theory puts an intolerable strain upon the meaning of μετάνοια, which involves a real change of mind corresponding to the prophetic doctrine of "return". How can this be attributed to the sinless Son of God, whose face is always turned towards His Father? How can it be equated with the unchanging holiness of God? The theory displaced or overshadowed the scriptural teaching concerning interchanges of love in the Trinity, although that teaching would have been the best answer to the crude notions of an angry Father punishing His innocent Son, which Moberly desired to combat. No use is made of such texts as "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son" and "For this cause doth the Father love me because I lay down my life" (John iii, 16 and x, 17), or again, "He who spared not his own Son" (Rom. viii, 32). Reaction from popular tritheism seems to have turned the author's mind away from this most evangelical aspect of the atoning sacrifice.

A particularly noticeable example of this occurs at the beginning of the important chapter which sets forth the doctrine of vicarious penitence (chapter 6). The argument begins with a quotation of 2 Corinthians v, 21 and Romans viii, 3, both of which describe the Atonement in terms of an action of the Father directed towards the Son. But in the paragraphs which follow this fact is completely eliminated. After quoting the second text in full ("God sending his own Son . . . condemned sin . . ."), on the next page the author makes a paraphrase in which the sending of the Son drops out and *the condemnation of sin is transferred from the Father to the Son.* From that point onwards the action of the Father in relation to the Son's sacrifice disappears completely from this central chapter. In the discussion of the Trinity in chapter 8 the author seems to be feeling his way towards the doctrine of Coinherence; yet that doctrine is never clearly reached. Once again there is a curious silence about the themes which have such prominence in St Paul and St John. Moberly seems here to have been too anxiously concerned to rebut tritheism to be able to give his attention fully to the treasures of the Gospel. He rightly emphasized our mystical identity with Christ through the Spirit as against a merely external transaction. Yet even the transactional notions of traditional thought bear witness to factors in Scripture which are scarcely noticed in this book.

There is another serious omission. Hardly any reference is made to the Resurrection, and none at all to the miracle of the empty tomb. Yet in the apostolic writings this event more than any other is the proof that the Father is well pleased with the Son's sacrifice, and that the victory over the hostile powers has been secured. Both points are crucial for soteriology, corresponding as they do to the meaning of such words as ἱλασμός

and ἀπολύτρωσις. Moreover, the Resurrection is the reversal of the disorder introduced into creation by the Fall. But it is just these aspects of Atonement which lie outside the scope of Moberly's argument. He thought of our Lord's sacrifice in terms drawn from our personal experience of repentance and from the human factors which assist our recovery—that is, from the discipline of penitence on the one hand and the vicarious sorrows of the good on behalf of the wayward on the other. Moral and rational factors are stressed as against arbitrary views of God and unethical conceptions of justice. But there are elements of the biblical revelation which transcend our present experience and which also transcend rational analysis. God's ways with His children far surpass the compass of our minds. The manifestation of those ways was given in concrete facts and set forth in the pictorial language of Scripture. The whole forms a pattern beyond comprehension to which faith can yet give reasoned assent. Such analysis as was attempted in *Atonement and Personality* was certainly not without value. Yet we must surely recognize that it is far from corresponding to the given pattern of the whole.

MIRFIELD. L. S. THORNTON, C.R.

CORRESPONDENCE

ANGLICANISM AND THE PAPACY

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

The observations which suggested themselves to Dr Sykes on Mr Rees' book *The Faith in England* in your June number (pp. 356-362) would have seemed less interesting if they had appeared thirty years ago than they do to-day, for a variety of reasons. No doubt Mr Rees can look after himself, and in any case it is not my business to fill your pages with a detailed catalogue of Dr Sykes' more peculiar statements. But a few preliminary comments on some of them will help to justify my own purpose in intervening, which is to raise a wider question than could be involved in any defence of Mr Rees' book as such.

Dr Sykes defends a view of post-Reformation Anglican history which is still, I take it, widely held, as having been one loud, long, consistent cry, in the Ephesian manner, of "No Popery in any shape or form!" One can only wonder whether this view will survive many such defences. I do not question either Dr Sykes' erudition or his general preference for history over theses, but I confess I find it difficult to follow his notion of the bearing of evidence. Thus, his first main point is the assertion that "It is difficult to interpret the statement of Article

37—*Romanus Pontifex nullam habet jurisdictionem in hoc regno Angliæ*—as embracing only civil and not ecclesiastical jurisdiction." In view of the title of this Article—*De Civilibus Magistratibus*—one would have supposed that the difficulty lay wholly the other way. He omits to mention this, but proceeds, apparently as justification for his own interpretation of the Article, to cite the preamble to a parliamentary statute a generation earlier, which contained a gross and palpable lie about the whole previous history of England. This Dr Sykes reinforces with a statement of the views of the lower house of Canterbury Convocation in 1534, apparently as voicing the opinion of the Church when the Article was framed. The declaration of Elizabeth's first Convocation might have seemed at least as relevant to the year 1563, but let us see how far Dr Sykes' own evidence supports him. The province of Canterbury in 1534 contained 18 dioceses, each represented by its Dean, Archdeacons, and Proctors, besides Conventual Priors, etc.—*i.e.*, not less than about 75 persons and probably considerably more. Of these, only 34 could be induced by all the royal pressure then exerted to voice the opinion Dr Sykes believes they must have held—*i.e.*, less than half. No one disputes the anti-Papal intentions of the Crown under Henry VIII. What is in question is the intention of the English Church then and later.

Rather to my surprise, I find that (excluding parliamentary statutes, which are not framed by the Church of England or as *loci theologici*) the only colourable point in favour of "No Popery" as a declared Anglican tenet which Dr Sykes has been able to produce is his citation of the 36th canon of 1604. But obviously Bp Andrewes did not share, and did not suppose King James I to share, Dr Sykes' theory that *regnum*, here as in Art. 37, must somehow mean "church", when, in 1610, he wrote his *Responsio ad Bellarminum*. Thus (in a refutation of the Cardinal's charges against James point by point) he writes: "Secundum crimen: *Negat* Rex Petri *primatum*. . . . Cum summa hoc Regis injuria. . . . Rex vero, Petrum non negat primum, *Principem* non negat *Apostolorum*; imo asserit. Sed, virtute primatus sui, *terrestrem Monarcham* negat, cui jus sit ac potestas Reges imperio in subditos exuendi, subditos a fide in Rege exsolvendi" (*Resp. ad Bell.* i, 14; ed. Oxford, 1851, p. 17). James I's own *Præfatio Admonitoria* (ed. 1610, pp. 63-4) fully bears out the bishop's statement that the point in dispute was then regarded in England as primarily one of civil jurisdiction: "Sit [Papa], per me licet, primus Episcopus inter omnes Episcopos; sed eo sensu Episcoporum Princeps quo Petrus Apostolorum Princeps fuit . . . pernego *terrestrem* esse aliquem *Ecclesiæ Monarcham*, cuius verba pro legibus esse debeant, quique infallibilitate spiritus nunquam in suis sententiis errare possit." (This, with its "nunquam", does not even formally contradict the carefully guarded Vatican definition of Infallibility "in

faith and morals" only. By identifying the Infallibility of the Pope with that of the Church, the Council implicitly supports James against certain contemporary Romanists who argued for a "separate" Infallibility of the Papal Office in *all* decisions, doctrinal and other.) For good measure, I will give another passage in which Andrewes speaks no longer for the King but for the Church (*op cit.*, viii, 217; ed. 1851, p. 299): "Nam, nec *Primatum* negamus Petri, nec quæ *Primatum* sonant *nomina*. Rem ipsam, quæ præ manu est, *terrestrem* eius *Monarchiam* petimus. . . . Scit [Cardinalis] non negari *Primatum* usquequaque, non *omnem*; scit, hoc iam loco, quem; *terrestrem* nempe *Monarchiam Ecclesiæ*." (Italics as in the originals.) The dispute in the seventeenth century, whatever it became later, was on the character of the Papal Supremacy as then presented for acceptance—viz., as a supremacy having some of the characteristics and functions of a *terrestris monarchia*, a claim which in some of its political consequences was obviously unjustified and intolerable. Dr Sykes has failed to notice how clearly this was brought out in Mr Rees' book (pp. 87-98).

However, bating the whole question of what canon 36 was supposed to mean by those who passed it, how has it since been understood by Anglican authority? Dr Sykes might have mentioned that this particular canon was repealed by the Convocations in 1865 (the consent of the Crown being had in 1866) apparently with no idea that they were thus removing the palladium of Anglican liberties. If he attaches his particular significance to the passing of this canon, he must presumably attach a reverse significance to its repeal—and, I suppose, at least have considered departing from a church which has thus feebly repudiated its own distinctive principle.

I venture to say that when it is closely examined nothing whatever remains of Dr Sykes' argument as regards the Church of England's statements, and little of his exceptions to those of Mr Rees save cavillings in the interests of Whig history. Thus, *e.g.*, he is a little vehement that Mr Rees did not set side by side the disuse of Convocation from 1664 to 1688 with its "suppressions" in 1689 and 1717. But were the cases really the same? The old occasion for the regular summons of Convocation had been that the clergy there voted their own taxes to the Crown as the laity did in Parliament. Dr Sykes will bear me out that there had quite often been little or no strictly ecclesiastical business to transact. The privilege of taxing themselves having been surrendered to Charles II, and Convocation not being then possessed by the omnicompetent zeal of our Church Assembly, there was little to cause it to be called—at least until the reign of James II—once the great reorganization of the Church, 1660-1663, had been completed. In 1689 Convocation was summoned to pass a ludicrous "Reunion" scheme promoted by the Government for political

purposes, and threw it out as contrary to Anglican doctrine. In 1717 it presumed to indict an episcopal *politique* on doctrinal grounds. In both cases it was promptly gagged by the politicians. There is a difference between the disuse of Convocation through a dearth of ecclesiastical business and its forcible suppression from fear of the ecclesiastical business actually before it. And it was not Mr Rees who " caricatured history " by passing over that difference.

There is quite a deal more of the same sort which might be said on all parts of Dr Sykes' observations. Thus, on his opening thrusts about the Anglo-Saxon Church—Did not the A-S. Archbishops of Canterbury at great trouble and expense procure from Rome their *pallium*, with all that this implied to contemporaries—*e.g.*, Bede ? Were there no legatine councils ? One could continue thus right down to his concluding crack—that " for the *via media* Mr Rees substitutes the *vicus rectus*." But the *vicus rectus* WAS the *via media*—running " straight " through the middle of ancient Damascus (and not in a circle, as Dr Sykes quaintly suggests on p. 357). However, I hope this is enough to justify raising my own point, which is to look at the matter in a wider setting than Mr Rees could do, but which the ineffectiveness of Dr Sykes' contentions on Anglican history now makes possible.

If the Church of England did not begin in the sixteenth century, still less did Christendom. During the last generation there has been a remarkable movement among historians towards the recognition of some sort of primacy of the Roman church and bishop in the pre-Nicene church and even in the second century. This is not a matter of pro-Roman controversy. It began with scholars like Harnack and Sohm and Caspar among Continental Protestants; it is found among scholars like Turner and Dr Kidd in England. Indeed, it seems fair to say that during the last generation the more penetrating and scientific the historian of early Christianity, the more candid has been his recognition of this particular aspect of his subject, even though in some cases the consciously anti-ecclesiastical explanation of the admitted facts has to some extent obscured the conclusions. From my personal acquaintance with some of the ablest of the younger patristic students in this country, in America, and—before the war—abroad, I should say that the tendency was not likely to be reversed at present. And now scholars like Schmidt (in the Kittel *Wörterbuch*) and Lietzmann are carrying the movement farther back still into the New Testament itself, in a way that would-be followers of Bp Jewel now may find rather disconcerting. Certainly, this early Roman Primacy is not quite the same thing as the Papacy became after the Hildebrandine centralization, and after the legists of Bologna had invested its action with juridical notions derived from Roman Law. The best Roman Catholic historians (*cf.*, *e.g.*, certain guarded sentences in Batiffol's posthumous *Cathedra Petri*) reveal their full awareness

of this difference. And, what is perhaps more surprising, some Roman theologians have shown a willingness to consider the ecclesiological function of the Papacy in terms of this classical conception and not exclusively of developed Canon Law. All this has been going on for at least a generation.

Mr Rees, of course, approached his own subject with a wholly different purpose. But his book suggests to a patristic student the interesting corollary that the Church of England has all along preserved some instinctive sense of primitive Christian realities as we are now coming to understand them, both in what he claims that she recognized as the unique function of the Pope in the Universal Church and in what she obviously disputed of the medieval Papal prerogative. Dr Sykes, on the contrary, brings forward in effect nothing but an enthusiastic plea that the Church of England has all along been *wrong*, from the standpoint of scientific history, about the line she has taken over this particular matter. Dr Sykes may be correct in his contention, even though he has not yet adequately presented his case. But if he is, there are likely to be some headaches among Anglicans when the results of research eventually seep through into the textbooks. It was doubtless some understanding of this which moved *The Guardian* to the unexpected declaration that the thesis of Mr Rees might in the end turn out to be the strongest defence of the Church of England "*against* Roman Catholicism". It seems at least an indication of Mr Rees' medial position that a distinguished Jesuit in *The Month* has seen fit to adopt towards his book much the same line as Dr Sykes, while supporting a very different contention.

My own discontent with Dr Sykes' observations does not arise just from the fact that he has written an inadequate and misleading review. After all, that might happen to any of us, and is the affair of the author or the editor rather than mine. My complaint is rather that he is still fighting a battle in the last war but one with the equipment of the last war but two. I venture with great deference to suggest that it is just this sort of Bourbonism—this steady refusal even to be aware of questions which were not already obvious twenty-five years ago—which does most to exacerbate that division between the so-called "older" and "younger" schools to-day (age is not the real line of distinction) of which we have heard a good deal from both sides, but which still seems to worry the students more than it does most of the pundits.

I am, Sir,
Your servant *in Dno*,
GREGORY DIX, O.S.B.

As from NASHDOM ABBEY,
BURNHAM,
BUCKS.
June 24, 1941.

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

In my review of Mr Rees' *The Faith in England* I ventured to criticize his view of the attitude of the Church of England towards the authority of the papacy, to suggest that he had given insufficient attention to the English Prayer Books as evidence of a doctrinal reformation, to claim that his citations of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Anglican authors were unrepresentative to the point of unfairness, and to observe that his account of Anglican history since 1688 was a caricature. Fr Dix, who has rallied to his defence, confines himself mainly to my first point, with a side glance at my last. I will follow his example in this reply, noting however that the other points have been defended only by silence.

Article 37, as Fr Dix observes, is concerned with Civil Magistrates, but not with civil *jurisdiction* only, since it deals with the ecclesiastical jurisdiction properly exercisable by civil magistrates. I venture to quote Tract XC, "which interpreted the XXXIX Articles in accordance with the Anglican heritage of doctrine and discipline" (Rees: p. 171). In this Newman wrote:

> "The bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in this realm of England." By "hath" is meant "ought to have" as the Article in the 36th Canon and the oath of Supremacy show, in which the same doctrine is drawn out at more length. "No foreign prince, person, *prelate*, state or potentate hath *or ought to have* any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm."
>
> This is the profession which every one must in consistency make who does not join the Roman church. If the bishop of Rome has jurisdiction and authority here, why do we not acknowledge it, and submit to him? To say, then, the above words is nothing more or less than to say "I am not a Roman Catholic"; and whatever reasons there are against saying them are so far reasons against remaining in the English Church. They are a mere enunciation of the principle of Anglicanism.

Fr Dix comments on the disparity between the number of clergy of the Lower House of Canterbury Convocation voting for the resolution against the jurisdiction of the papacy in 1534 and the total membership of that house. Unless he can tell us how many of its members were present at the session his figures prove nothing, for neither he nor I can judge of the opinions of absent members.

Fr Dix next quotes Bishop Andrewes' *Responsio ad Bellarminum*. It is useful side by side with his quotations to set others from the same work. Thus Andrewes argues that the words *Pasce oves meas* do not give any greater authority to Peter than to other apostles.

> Voce enim illa, *pascendi*,[1] Petro peculiare nihil accrescere dixit Augustinus, *Cum Petro dicitur, ad omnes dicitur, Pasce oves meas*. Voce illa,

Oves meas, nihil peculiare Petro accrescere dixit Ambrosius, *Eas oves non solum Beatus suscepit Petrus, sed et nobiscum eas accepit, et nos cum illo accepimus omnes ;* nempe dictum illi *Pasce*, tam in persona aliorum quam sua.

But Andrewes is bolder still, and proceeds to apply the Dominical words to civil kings and to attack Bellarmine for not declaring this !

Verum, vim videamus argumenti. Perinde enim facile nobis, ex voce *pascendi*, Primatum Regis astruere, atque illi Pontificis, quod (scio) *punget* Cardinalem. Atque ut mensura sua remetiamur ei, stylo ipsius loquamur cum ipso: *Negat Cardinalis primatum Regis, et tamen Regi dixit Deus ipse, Tu pasces populum meum Israel, Ubi nemo negare potest* Regem factum esse Pastorem totius Israelis, et ipsorum etiam sacerdotum, *nisi neget* ipsos etiam Sacerdotes fuisse partem Israelis. Narro autem Cardinali: Quodsi, in *Pastoris* titulo, ad primatum momenti quid sit, vel si ea voce transigenda res nobis: in Sacris literis titulum istum et prius multo Principi delatum, et vero sæpius multo quam Pontifici. (*Op. cit.*, i. 16, p. 20.)

My " theory that *regnum* must somehow mean church " seems to be a misstatement by Fr Dix of the admitted Tudor theory of *ein Reich, ein Volk, eine Kirche* which historians have understood to be the principle of the English Reformation; and Hooker himself wrote that

seeing there is not any man of the Church of England but the same is also a member of the Commonwealth, nor any man a member of the Commonwealth which is not also of the Church of England . . . so albeit properties and actions of one kind do cause the name of a commonweath, qualities and functions of another sort the name of a Church to be given unto a multitude, yet one and the selfsame multitude may be in such sort be both, and is so with us, that no person appertaining to the one can be denied to be also of the other (*Ecclesiastical Polity*, VIII, i, 2).

Fr Dix wonders how " the only colourable point ", that of Canon 36 of the Canons of 1604, was understood by its framers, has " since been understood by Anglican authority ", and what is the significance of its repeal in 1865. Have neither he nor Mr Rees observed the history of the Oath of Supremacy in the Ordinal of the English Prayer Books? In the first Edwardine Ordinal, in the Ordering of Deacons, before the Gospel the bishop

" shall cause the Oath of the King's Supremacy and against the usurped power of the Bishop of Rome to be ministered unto every one of them that are to be ordered."

The oath contained the following clauses:

I from henceforth shall utterly renounce, refute, relinquish, and forsake the bishop of Rome, and his authority, power, and jurisdiction. And I shall never consent nor agree that the bishop of Rome shall practise, exercise, or have any manner of authority, jurisdiction, or power within this realm or any other of the king's dominions, but shall resist the same at all times, to the uttermost of my power.

The same oath was repeated in the Ordering of Priests and Consecrating of Archbishops and Bishops. It was repeated in the 1552 Ordinal. In the Elizabethan Ordinal of 1559 the Oath of the Queen's Sovereignty contained these words:

> I A.B. do utterly testify and declare . . . that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm; and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictions, powers, superiorities, and authorities.

The same oath was repeated in all the ordination and consecration offices; and also upon licence to a curacy or institution to a benefice. In 1865, before the appointment of the Commission on Clerical Subscription, the Oath of the Queen's Sovereignty in the Ordinal still retained the words:

> I do declare that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have, any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm.

The Report of the Commission on Clerical Subscription, 1865, recommended " that the Oath of Allegiance and Supremacy be taken before and not during the Ordination and Consecration services " (Report: paragraph VII, Recommendations IIIrd). Accordingly the Clerical Subscription Act of 1865 (28 and 29 Victoria, c. 122, paragraph 4) enacted that

> every person about to be ordained priest or deacon shall before ordination in the presence of the archbishop or bishop by whom he is about to be ordained, at such time as he may appoint, make and subscribe the declaration of assent, and take and subscribe the oath of allegiance and supremacy according to the form set forth in the Act of the Session of the 21st and 22nd years of the Reign of her present Majesty, chapter 48.

The form of oath prescribed by 21 and 22 Victoria, c. 48, " An Act to substitute one oath for the oaths of allegiance, supremacy and abjuration " contained the words:

> I do declare that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm.

The effect of the changes in 1865 therefore seems to have been limited to the affirmation of this form of words once instead of twice (*i.e.*, as part of the oath of allegiance and supremacy instead of as part also of the declaration of assent) and to the taking of the oath before instead of during the ordination or consecration services. The oath was to be taken as before on the occasion of licence to a curacy or admission to a benefice. The church, according to Mr Rees, " denied the civil jurisdiction of the papacy in this realm, saying nothing of its spiritual jurisdiction " (p. 138). The taking of such an oath formally on so many occasions in the ministerial

career of its clergy seems an unusually vociferous and clamant way of "saying nothing of the spiritual jurisdiction" of the pope. The substitution by an Act of Parliament—31 and 32 Victoria, c. 72, the Promissory Oaths Act of 1868—of the simple oath of allegiance in its present form was a result, like the modification of the terms of assent to the Prayer Book and Articles in 1865, of that liberalism of the nineteenth century against which in other connexions the *Signpost* authors are in resolute reaction.

It may be useful to emphasize the importance of accuracy in definition of terms. Mr Rees says that the Church of England was content with "saying nothing about the spiritual jurisdiction" of the papacy. Fr Dix draws my attention to the movement during the last generation towards the recognition "of some sort of primacy of the Roman church and bishop". My criticism of Mr Rees had reference to the repudiation by the Church of England of the *ecclesiastical or spiritual jurisdiction* of the papacy. When Fr Dix defines exactly what is meant by "some sort of primacy" it will be time enough to consider the Anglican attitude to it during the four centuries since the Reformation. Meanwhile I am grateful of course to him for admonishing me upon a point of which I was not hitherto wholly ignorant.

There remain a few minor matters in Fr Dix's letter. What Mr Rees said was that the rejection of the 1689 Comprehension project "brought about the *first* suppression of Convocation". I replied that it had been suppressed between 1664 and 1688. Mr Dix says there "is a difference between the disuse of Convocation through a dearth of ecclesiastical business and its forcible suppression from fear of the ecclesiastical business actually before it". I am quite prepared to deal with that issue if the editor wishes this reply to cover as much space as I should desire, for I should have to remind Fr Dix of the history of the Convocation controversy, which had convinced zealous high churchmen like Wake and Gibson that a temporary suspension was necessary. Fr Dix also reminds me of the pallium procured by "the Anglo-Saxon archbishops of Canterbury" from Rome, "with all that this implied to contemporaries—*e.g.*, Bede." I had been under the impression that the two successors of Augustine, Laurentius and Mellitus, did not receive a pallium; and Fr Dix knows as well as anyone that the history of the pallium is a good illustration of the growth of papal claims, as for example in the fact that the oath of papal obedience associated with it first made its appearance in the days of Gregory VII. The reference to Bede is interesting. For Bede's interpretation of the Dominical foundation of the church *super hanc petram* is as follows:

Petrus qui Simon antea dicebatur, ob fortitudinem fidei et confessionis suæ constantiam, a Domino Petri nomen accepit, quia videlicet illi firma ac tenaci mente adhæsit de quo scriptum est: Petra autem erat

Christus (1 Cor. x, 4). Et super hanc petram, id est super Dominum Salvatorem, qui fideli suo cognitori, amatori, confessori, participium sui nominis donavit, ut videlicet a petra Petrus vocaretur; supra quam ædificatur Ecclesia, quia non nisi per fidem et dilectionem Christi, per susceptionem sacramentorum Christi, per observantiam mandatorum Christi ad sortem electorum et æternam pertingitur vitam. Apostolo attestante qui ait: Fundamentum enim aliud nemo potest ponere præter id quod positum est, quod est Christus Jesus (1 Cor. iii, 11).

Likewise Bede interprets the power of binding and loosing given to Peter in Matt. xvi, 19 in the light of the commission given to all the apostles in John xx, 22-23.

Quæ solvendi atque ligandi potestas, quamvis soli Petro videatur a Domino data, absque ulla tamen dubietate noscendum est quia et cæteris apostolis datur ipso teste qui post passionis resurrectionisque suæ triumphum, apparens eis insufflavit et dixit eis: Accipite Spiritum Sanctum. Quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis; et quorum retinueritis, retenta sunt (John xx, 22, 23). Necnon etiam nunc in episcopis ac presbyteris omni Ecclesiæ officium committitur.

In the light of these qualifications Bede was able freely to grant of Peter that *specialiter claves regni cœlorum et principatum judiciariæ potestatis accepit* (Homilia XVI, "In Natale Beatorum Apostolorum Petri et Pauli," Migne, *P.L.*, 94, col. 222-23).

I am surprised that a defender of *Signposts* should rebuke me for using that allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures which has such august tradition to support it, in my representation of the *vicus rectus* as an *Autobahn* to and from Rome! Perhaps too the "unexpected declaration" of *The Guardian* in its review of Mr Rees' book would be less unexpected if Fr Dix and myself were able to reveal the name of its writer, which may perhaps be known to both of us.

For the rest I am sustained under the exuberant epithets of Fr Dix's accusations by the knowledge that I err in good company. *Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona*—even before Mr Rees and Fr Dix; and among them are many of the Caroline divines to whom the Tractarians made frequent appeal. Perhaps I may be permitted to conclude my letter with an illustration which seems to me peculiarly apt. The Gallican church by its Declaration of Liberties of 1682 had set forth a position which, so far as I understand him, Mr Rees claims to be that of the Church of England. The first article differentiated between the temporal and the spiritual power of the papacy:

Beato Petro eiusque successoribus Christi vicariis ipsique ecclesiæ rerum spiritualium et ad æternam salutem pertinentium, non autem civilium ac temporalium a Deo traditam potestam.

The second article restricted the spiritual power of the papacy by the famous decrees of the fourth and fifth sessions of the Council of Constance. The third article read:

Hinc apostolicæ potestatis usum moderandum per canones spiritu Dei conditos et totius mundi reverentia consecratos; valere etiam regulas, mores, et instituta a regno et ecclesia Gallicana recepta, patrumque terminos manere inconcussos.

Finally, the fourth article allowed of the papacy that:

In fide quoque quæstionibus præcipuas summi pontificis esse partes, eiusque decreta ad omnes et singulas ecclesias pertinere, nec tamen irreformabile esse iudicium, nisi ecclesiæ consensus accesserit. (Mirbt: *Quellen*, pp. 389-390.)

It is interesting therefore to notice that when Archbishop Wake entered into correspondence with Gallican divines to explore the possibilities of a formal union between the Anglican and Gallican churches he insisted throughout on the necessity of the French church breaking away entirely from the papacy and then undertaking a reformation of other matters.

The rest of my letters . . . is a venture, which I know not how they will take, to convince them of the necessity of embracing the present opportunity of breaking off from the pope, and going one step further than they have yet done in their opinion of his authority; so as to leave him only a primacy of place and honour; and that merely by ecclesiastical authority, as he was once bishop of the imperial city. . . .

Si quam prærogativam ecclesiæ concilia sedis imperialis episcopo concesserint (etsi cadente imperio etiam ea prærogativa excidisse merito possit censeri), tamen, quod ad me attinet, servatis semper regnorum juribus, ecclesiarum libertatibus, episcoporum dignitate, modo in cæteris conveniatur, per me licet suo fruatur qualicunque primatu. Non ego illi locum primum, non inanem honoris titulum invideo. . . .

At present my more particular curiosity leads me to know the sentiments of the leading men in France with regard to the Court of Rome; from whom if we could once divide the Gallican Church, a reformation in other matters would follow of course. . . .

As to the pope's authority, I take the difference to be only this; that we may all agree, without troubling ourselves with the reason, to allow him a primacy of order in the episcopal college. They would have it thought necessary to hold communion with him, and allow him a little canonical authority over them, as long as he will leave them to prescribe the bounds of it. We fairly say we know of no authority he has in our realm. (J. H. Lupton: *Archbishop Wake and the Project of Union between the Anglican and Gallican Churches*, pp. 65, 69,76, 86.)

Mr Rees will have it that the Church of England "denied the civil jurisdiction of the papacy in this realm, saying nothing of its spiritual jurisdiction". Wake affirmed that "we honestly deny the pope any authority over us". I could wish that Fr Dix had made clear whether he stands by Mr Rees' declaration or with Wake. His "some sort of a primacy" surely should be defined before we are invited to pronounce upon it. I could wish too that he had dealt with my other criticisms of Mr Rees; for I cannot think the Prayer Books unimportant in a consideration of the doctrinal changes of the Anglican Reforma-

tion. Nor can I regard the abundant evidence of the attitude of many of the Caroline divines towards the foreign reformed churches as without relevance to the questions at issue. Most especially I cannot see why the insistent repetition of oaths by the Anglican clergy against the spiritual or ecclesiastical jurisdiction or authority of any foreign prelate for more than three hundred years should have been passed over without mention by Mr Rees and Fr Dix, unless they deem iterated perjury to be of the *bene esse* of the Church of England.

I am, Sir,
Yours, etc.,

July, 1941. NORMAN SYKES.

[We regret that, owing to exigencies of space, it will not be possible to continue this correspondence.—ED. THEOLOGY.]

A GEM OF PATRISTIC LITERATURE

THE centuries are strewn with the flotsam and jetsam of literature once known and valued, but now forgotten save in fragments familiar only, or mainly, to specialists. The second century of our era is no exception. Yet a considerable number of books survive, in whole or part—enough, at least, to show us something of the extent of our losses. Not to mention pagan authors, we have, for example, the letters of Ignatius, the two apologies of Justin, the Octavius of Minucius Felix, and much of Irenæus. But among all these survivals few writings have a greater interest (and value) than the epistle to Diognetus, which Lightfoot could call a "noble letter", and of which Swete said that it appeals to modern readers more than any other early Christian writing outside the New Testament.

Its authorship is unknown, and its date uncertain; but if, with Lightfoot, we ascribe it to the middle of the second century, we shall probably be not far wrong. Diognetus, to whom the letter is addressed, may well have been the tutor of the Stoic Emperor, Marcus Aurelius; that he was a man of some standing is evident from the fact that he is addressed in the letter as "Your Excellency" (κράτιστε), the title given by Luke to Theophilus, to whom his gospel is dedicated. And it is reasonable to suppose that Diognetus was a genuine inquirer about that new religion which was beginning not only to influence so many in the Roman world but also to arouse grave misgivings in official circles. It was being increasingly felt that the faith, with its strange and secret rites, might become a danger to the State itself, and a growing menace to pagan orthodoxy as embodied in the established official cults. A clear challenge to the fabric of government was manifested by the refusal of Christians to make any concession to emperor-worship, which by this time

had almost superseded the time-honoured homage to the Olympian deities. It was easy enough, therefore, to work up violent attacks on Christians, and in these attacks the ignorant populace took an active share. Moreover, as we may gather from Pliny's letter to Trajan, vested interests of a commercial character were threatened by the new faith; temples were deserted, and trade suffered in consequence. Besides all this, Christians were attacked for their supposed "hatred of the human race" and their resolute refusal to take part in social life, set as it was in the midst of an unabashed idolatry. Yet no serious attempt was made by pagan thinkers or statesmen to understand what Christianity was, apart from the work of Celsus, who, though he knew a good deal of the religion he scornfully abused, was far too prejudiced to accord it even a measure of justice. In fact, Christians were everywhere persecuted, *unheard*. It was enough for a man to confess himself a Christian to be handed over to the executioner without more ado. Now the main object of the Apologists was to compel their enemies to hear them before condemning them; perhaps they called to mind the famous saying of Themistocles to Eurybiades, *πάταξον μὲν ἄκουσον δέ*—"strike but listen". And of all these Apologists none presented a case for the defence with greater tact and judgment than the author of the epistle to Diognetus, "written in the first instance to satisfy an enquirer, not to conciliate an enemy," as Westcott remarks.

What does the letter contain within its brief compass?[1] Not a definite doctrinal statement; indeed "doctrine", at least in its later theological significance, is almost entirely excluded, probably of set purpose. Questions of Church order and ritual are left untouched; it is the moral implication of the Faith that is stressed throughout; the writer's aim was to show the "sweet reasonableness" (*ἐπιείκεια*) of Christianity and to confute the cruel as well as ridiculous slanders levelled at it by heathens. We find nothing in the epistle to match the savage rhetoric of Tertullian; the only sharp words were reserved for a criticism of Judaism and, oddly enough, for the writings of Heraclitus,[2] to whom a special antipathy is shown, as the final words of the epistle—which breaks off uncompleted—seem to indicate. The

[1] Only chapters i-x are part of the original document. The two final chapters (xi and xii), though invariably printed along with the rest, are by a different hand.

[2] Heraclitus of Ephesus (*flor. c.* 500 B.C.) found the primary substance of the *κόσμος* in fire—"an ever-living fire", as he calls it. His place in philosophy is important: see Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, chap. iii; Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Vol. I; W. A. Butler's lectures on the *History of Ancient Philosophy*. Justin has a good word for him as a Christian before Christ, and brackets him with Socrates. Eusebius, in *Preparatio Evangelica*, constantly refers to Heraclitus.

old philosopher is condemned to everlasting fire, though his name is not actually given.[1]

To enable a reader, hitherto unfamiliar with the epistle to Diognetus, to get some notion of its tone and quality, I shall give a few paragraphs taken from chapters v-vii:

"Christians do not differ from mankind at large either in territory, in language, or in their way of life. They observe local customs, and practise no strange fashions; yet for all that there is something about them which is peculiar to themselves. Thus: they dwell each in his own country, but only as pilgrims and sojourners. They share the same duties as their fellow-citizens, yet suffer every indignity as foreigners. Every foreign land is, for them, a fatherland, and every fatherland is foreign. They are in the flesh, but live not after the flesh. They obey the laws while passing their days on earth, but their citizenship is in heaven. They love all men—and are persecuted by all. Doing good, they are penalized as doers of evil, assaulted by Jews as foreigners, by heathen as fit subjects for attack. And those that hate them can assign no reason for their hatred. In a word—what the soul is to the body, the Christians are to the world. And mark this: the greater the number of those persecuted, the more does the number of the rest increase. Surely these things are not the works of men; they are the power of God, and the tokens of His divine presence."

It is of some importance to note that before the middle of the second century the whole climate of religious thought in the Mediterranean world was in process of change. There was everywhere a "failure of nerve", which manifested itself in varying ways.[2] Matthew Arnold's lines (in *Obermann*) emphasize this:

> On that hard Pagan world disgust
> And secret loathing fell;
> Deep weariness and sated lust
> Made human life a hell.

Intellectual and spiritual influences from the East had resulted in an ever-increasing crop of novel beliefs: votaries of Isis and Serapis, votaries of the Great Mother, Orphic cults, a passion for astrological speculations, and—itself a derivative from the Orient—that Emperor-worship[3] which was to prove a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence to the Christian community. And Rome was the clearing-house of these competing theologies, as Juvenal scornfully wrote:

> Jam pridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes.

---

[1] He is obviously referred to (though again not by name) in chap. viii.

[2] See Gilbert Murray, *Five Stages*, chap. iv.

[3] Consult Ramsay, *The Church in the Roman Empire*, on this point.

The gods of the Olympic pantheon had long been discredited; they were now dying or dead, though their worship was still observed as part of the State tradition. A new spirit was slowly gathering momentum; the cry was for some clear revelation of God in human life, for the world was starved of any true food for the spirit; the old standards were felt to be inadequate; men were becoming more and more conscious of the need for redemption. The strange thing was that, when Christianity openly proclaimed its message, with its promise of salvation and its assurance of another, better, life to redress the balance of the old, this message was despised and rejected by those who should have been ready to welcome it. Perhaps Christianity started with a heavy handicap; it was an offshoot of Judaism, and the heathen world felt for the Jews a hatred which was returned with interest. But, for all that, Christianity was spreading more and more rapidly than historians have been willing, sometimes, to admit; and not all its converts came from the despised classes. The sneers of Celsus and of Gibbon had no such justification as some have supposed.

Moreover, we may observe that whereas, in the days of Nero and Domitian, Christians were prosecuted as criminals, charged with "flagitia", and as magicians, they were later on persecuted merely *as Christians* ("for the name"). There was now an opportunity for Apologists like Justin, Aristides, and others, to come forward and state their case. If, cries Tertullian, we are proved to be guilty of crime, then let us be punished according to law; but if not, why should we be treated differently from the followers of other cults? His splendid defence, known as the *Apologeticus*, is an answer to those questions. But a conciliatory answer it can hardly be called. Now the epistle to Diognetus is cast in a different mould. Whether it exercised any considerable influence, we cannot tell; it would have been interesting had we been informed what was the reaction of Diognetus to the letter of his correspondent; but history is silent on the matter. The letter is a blend of Pauline and Johannine teaching; the writer is careful to lay stress on the love of God, arguing that this divine love is the parent and original of all Christian love, for by love to his neighbour man becomes an imitator of God. And God's love to mankind was shown supremely by the sending of His Son into the world, not to condemn the world but to save it. Words indeed, full of beauty and truth, but how strangely they must have fallen on heathen ears! It is this insistence on the *love* of God, and of its final manifestation in the Incarnation itself, that runs like a golden thread through the whole epistle, which draws to its end in these glowing and tender words:

"Through His exceeding goodness and power He bore with us till the season came which He had foreordained; He did not repel us, but was long-suffering, finally giving up His own Son

as a ransom—the Just for the unjust, the Incorruptible for the corruptible. For what save His righteousness could have covered our sins? How could we have been justified but in the Son of God alone?"

The theology of the epistle is not fully developed, nor could it be: the fourth century, with its definitions, its elaborated dogmatics, its ecumenical creeds, was two centuries away; but none the less the writer has a true grasp of what is fundamental and universal in the Faith he proclaims with so sure an insight and with so persuasive a presentation. The epistle to Diognetus is not without a lesson for us, even after the lapse of eighteen hundred years of earnest contending for the Faith once for all delivered to believers.

E. H. Blakeney.

Winchester.

THE PERSONNEL OF THE CHURCH ASSEMBLY

(*Communicated*)

The Official Year Book of the Church of England gives a good many pages to a section entitled "Who's Who in the Church Assembly". To publish this in 1941 may strike some people as indefensible. But, as those concerned with such things know, the disturbance of type caused by altering an annual is a serious matter, and the extra labour involved may outweigh the saving of paper. Let us examine the information given in regard to families and recreations and see what sociological results it yields.

The results are interesting in so far as they illustrate tendencies; the details must not be pressed—for these reasons. Accuracy in compiling statistics from a mass of small print is hard to achieve. Some of the people mentioned have omitted to record the fact of their marriage. In a few cases there is the complication of husband and wife both being members of the Assembly. Some may not have recorded their deceased children. It would be safe to reckon a margin of 10 per cent. of error. In any case the tendencies of thirty or forty years ago are reflected rather than those of today. And allowances must be made for the late marriages of many clergy.

The Assembly consists of 43 bishops, 342 members of the House of Clergy, and 345 laymen. To these are added the names of 62 clerical and 61 lay co-opted members of various boards and councils connected with the Assembly. The resulting totals are 447 clerical names and 406 lay.

Of these, 289 of the clergy and 278 of the laity are returned as married. The children are as follows:

	Clergy.	*Totals.*	*Laity.*	*Totals.*
Childless ...	76	—	68	—
1 child	36	36	42	42
2 children ...	39	78	51	102
3 „ ...	56	168	52	156
4 „ ...	46	184	33	132
5 „ ...	15	75	17	85
6 „ ...	15	90	9	54
7 „ ...	3	21	1	7
8 „ ...	2	16	4	32
9 „ ...	1	9	1	9
		677		619

The children per marriage are 2·3 for the clergy, 2·2 for the laity. As at least 3 children are needed to continue the race, the class of churchmen here represented is far from reproducing itself.

Recreations are naturally far harder to estimate from casual returns. Many people do not mention them at all. Among those who do, many different methods will be used. A person who has to keep a large garden in order without help is unlikely to include gardening as his recreation. A country squire who uses his car as a matter of course every day of the week will not look on motoring as a recreation. And there are many busy people who are as sociable as their duties allow, and have their diversions made for them by their wives and daughters.

With these caveats, let us look at some of the answers given by the clergy. Golf comes easily first with 68 votes, followed by tennis with 48. Next comes gardening and fishing, each with 22. Other pursuits which reach double figures are: travelling, 21; motoring and walking, 18; music, 14; reading and cricket, 10.

These are some figures for the laity: golf, 31; walking, 26; shooting and tennis, 19; fishing, gardening and reading, 15; motoring, 14; music, 11; boating, etc., 7; hunting, 6. Clearly the country squire class is well represented.

The really striking thing is the way these men and women differ from the masses of the people, whose characteristic pleasures are cinemas, racing, " the dogs," watching football matches, bridge, whist drives. Compare the figures from our list: cinema, 1 layman; racing, 0; " the dogs," 0; football, 1 parson, 1 layman; bridge, 1 parson; whist drives, 0. This suggests a great gulf between our Church legislators and ordinary people. But what can be done ? Would the people who prefer a mass-produced amusement, like the pictures, render better service than those who prefer to " do something " themselves ?

Another reflection which suggests itself is that the natural recreation of most clergy and laity is some form or other of " keep-

ing fit". Music is mentioned by a few, but otherwise the arts are hardly represented at all. No one says " reading poetry ".

Nevertheless in the present personnel large sections of the population are unrepresented. When the efforts were being made which led to the setting up of the Church Assembly, considerable stress was laid on the necessity of securing working-class representation. Nothing seems to have come of this. If the question comes up again, it might be considered from a different angle. At present a layman is expected to serve on the Parochial Church Council, Ruridecanal Conference, and Diocesan Conference, before he is chosen to represent the diocese on the Assembly. The burden on a busy man who has to earn his living and support a growing family is too great.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

Allen and Unwin: G. P. Dixon, *Let the Bible help You* (3s. 6d.).

Cape: J. Duguid, *I am Persuaded* (12s. 6d.).

Colonial Bishoprics Fund (15, Tufton St., S.W.1): W. F. France, *The Oversea Episcopate*, 1841-1941 (1s.).

Dacre Press: Charles Williams, *Religion and Love in Dante* (6d.).

Dent: M. B. Reckitt, *As it happened* (12s. 6d.).

Fortune Press: Ashley Sampson, *The Ghost of Mr Brown* (6s.).

Gollancz: Sidney Dark, *The Church, Impotent or Triumphant?* (3s. 6d.).

Longmans (New York): W. S. Bishop, *Christ and the Spirit* ($2.00).

Methuen: R. A. Edwards, *The Upper Room* (7s. 6d.).

Oxford University Press: *The English Poems of John Milton* (2s. 6d.); F. M. Powicke, *The Reformation in England* (6s.); C. H. Hopkins, *The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism, 1865-1915* (18s. 6d.).

Round Table Press (New York): W. Norman Pittenger, *Christ and Christian Faith* ($2.00).

Sheldon Press: K. Barth, *A Letter to Great Britain from Switzerland*; C. J. Stranks: *Japan in the World Crisis* (1s. 6d. each).

Williams and Norgate: E. C. Thomas, *History of the Schoolmen* (30s.).

BOOK REVIEWS

PUTTING OUR HOUSE IN ORDER. Longmans. 4s. 6d.

The publication of this sequel to *Men, Money, and the Ministry* is an event of no small importance. It will bring hope to many who have, for long, felt the drag upon the chariot wheels of the picturesque, but sub-Christian, economy of the Church of England. The desire for reform is widespread, but until now the individual has had little opportunity of expressing it in any way which would be in the least effective.

This dissatisfaction is so deep that great care must be taken to remember that which must be the governing motive in all reform—our desire that the Word of God may be more effectively preached and the sacraments more faithfully administered. If, for example, the parson's freehold, in its present form, is a necessity for the exercising of his pastoral office, it must remain. Many feel, on the contrary, that it is a very real hindrance, and should be limited in some such way as suggested in this book. It is difficult to believe that the position of a pastor whose only desire is to serve could be weakened by the proposals (1) that an incumbent may be moved to another parish after eight or ten years by the Bishop in Council, (2) that there should be a compulsory retiring age, (3) that a higher standard of legal minimum requirements should be set, and (4) that the grounds on which an incumbent can be removed should include " habitual offences which notoriously ruin an incumbent's influence in the parish ". If such proposals were accepted, the position of the Bishop and his Council would be strengthened if there were a properly constituted Diocesan Synod, of which no mention is made.

In the same way, it is difficult, from a purely Christian standpoint, to see the objection to the pooling of the financial resources of the Church; it seems clearly a Scriptural thing to do. There can be no possible moral justification for our present system, and it does much to make the ministry static rather than mobile. A system of pooling would remove a very great temptation from the searcher after " plums " and comfortable " livings ".

One curious defect in the book is that it appears to leave the Bishops out of the scheme. Why should they be so deprived? Certainly the writers timidly glance at the fact that their pensions are £600 more than those of the other clergy, but then they hurry away to something else. Nothing is said of other matters, such as houses or incomes. The former are, in some cases, very real difficulties to the Bishop, and grave stumbling-blocks to an increasing number of ordinary men to whom the Palace seems entirely out of keeping with the standards of Christianity. Another unnecessary stumbling-block would be removed if a

division were made between personal income and " allowances ", as is proposed for priests and deacons.

An argument which is being used—even by *The Times* newspaper—against proposals to pool incomes is that even so there would not be enough money. It is a curious argument against a fairer distribution of what there is ! The present proposals do not, however, face this fact squarely. The book certainly suggests that gifts may be held up because of our present muddle, but in the immediate future it is doubtful if the finances of the Church are to be much strengthened by large gifts. The Church overseas should, by now, have shown us that we must teach the laity of the Church of England to give. There should be, as in some dioceses abroad, a minimum sum to be given by each full member of the Church each week. If we could do this, and abolish our collections and appeals, we might be on our way to financial sanity. This is no minor matter, and should have been considered.

It is clear that reform must include some manner of financial reform if for no other reason than that the present system, especially in the country, is breaking down. On the other hand, the " Ten Propositions for Reform " (pp. 118, 119), good or bad as they may be, which deal entirely with matters of finance and the parson's freehold, must blind no one to the fact that the carrying out of these propositions alone will not inevitably mean that all will be well with the Church. It is true (p. 65) that it is no use " stamping on the accelerator if the engine is out of gear and the clutch is worn out ". It is equally true that the most perfect gear-box is of only academic interest if there is no petrol in the tank.

Already the dust is rising from the preliminary skirmishes round the important positions—pooling of incomes, security of tenure (picturesque and very English anachronisms), and the rest—and there is a danger that the necessary interest in this battle will obscure other and even more fundamental issues.

Would that there were space to consider the valuable early chapters of this book. In the second, for example, there is a useful discussion on the quite basic question of the ideal of Christian " classlessness ". Nothing, however, is said of the training of the clergy, both before and after ordination, to achieve this depth of culture.

Again, the importance of " The Church in the Country " is realized, but it is all rather remote, and the achievements of Councils of Social Service, etc., are quaintly exaggerated. A grave defect is the absence of any real discussion on the proposal to organize country work in larger areas (we continue to join parishes instead), although p. 31 is happily contradicted by pp. 62 and 66.

Moreover, nothing is said regarding the place of the Convocations or the reform of the Church Assembly, although it is

difficult to imagine a real diocesan representation until some scheme is devised by which the expenses of the members from the remote dioceses can be met; this might perhaps be one of the "variable allowances".

In conclusion we may regret the writers' evident doubt regarding the possibility of a "truly Pentecostal wind"; has not this doubt been the defect of every movement in our generation? A coming together of dry bones is of no very great value, however much committees may love the task of assembling them. Our only hope is that this stage may be followed by the coming of the life-giving breath, and this comes only by the word of the Lord God.

EDMUND W. SARA, BP.

WELLS.

MILITANT IN EARTH. Twenty Centuries of the Spread of Christianity. By Edward Roche Hardy, jr. O.U.P. 16s. 6d.

The American author of this book has set himself the difficult task of compressing within the limits of 237 pages of good-sized print the story of the impact of the Christian religion upon the life of mankind from its inception to the present day. He has fulfilled it with marked success. Experience may incline one to be ordinarily a little sceptical about the usefulness of such very broad outlines to those who are not already equipped with a certain knowledge of details to fill them in. But for the possessors of such equipment Dr Hardy's book will provide valuable help towards co-ordinating and extending their existing knowledge and will open up again and again very profitable lines of thought. And even the ordinary lay reader is likely to be attracted by a book which has nothing of the outline textbook about it but conveys both instruction and inspiration in a very interesting way—for which reason one cannot but regret that the book's English price is so high in proportion to its modest dimensions. The author's outlook is at once broad-minded and discriminating. He has the gift of distinguishing between the wood and the trees: and, in so far as he deals with particular happenings, they are always the salient and significant ones and are presented in due relation to one another. His work appears to rest on a wide, accurate, and up-to-date knowledge of his vast subject, and exhibits an easy, lucid, and very readable style, with the characteristic American gift of packing a great deal of meaning into a brief arresting sentence. A good example of this power of suggestive phrase is furnished by the chapter-headings characterizing the successive periods into which the author divides his subject: "Citizens of Heaven," "The Naturalizing of Christianity," "The Two Swords," "Friars, Fighters and Explorers," "Gold and Christians," "The Age of

Individuals." Or to take an example or two at random: " The Roman Church showed its wisdom in numbering both Callistus and Hippolytus among its saints "; (of Theodore of Tarsus) " So an aged Greek was appointed by an Italian to be the first real archbishop of the English Church "; " Two centuries and a half lead from Columbus searching for Cathay to Poor Richard uttering practical maxims "; " Pius X's encouragement of a revival of the liturgical life of the Church was really more modern than the speculations of the modernists; for the time was coming when men would need increasingly the strength of consciously sharing in the common life of a great tradition." The book concludes with a suggestive epilogue surveying the prospects of Christianity in face of the existing world situation, in regard to which the author epigrammatically remarks, " Life in a complex world is not easy, simply necessary." " It may be ", he says, " that we are entering a new period of confusion in human history, in which the human values of the past will hardly survive "; yet he holds that " unless " a policy of isolation " should be forced by circumstances, it seems better for the Church to make its policy one of critical co-operation with the powers of the world."

STALISFIELD. C. S. PHILLIPS.

HUMANISM IN ENGLAND DURING THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY. By R. Weiss. Basil Blackwell. 12s. 6d.

The need of a guide to the history of the early Renaissance in England must have been felt by anyone who, like the present reviewer, had to attempt a bibliography of English Latin writers of the fifteenth century, without even Schirmer's valuable book, *Der englische Frühhumanismus*, to help him. Schirmer's book, which appeared in 1931, was, as Dr Weiss says, the first scholarly publication on English fifteenth-century humanism, but it was based solely on printed sources. Dr Weiss's excellent book, the aim of which is to give a concise survey of the subject, takes into account not merely the printed sources, but a great range of material from manuscripts, one of which belongs to the Imperial University Library in Tokyo. He begins with the year 1418, marked by the arrival of Poggio in England, and ends with the year 1485 and the accession of Henry VII. From the latter date onwards, what Dr Weiss calls " the common front of scholasticism and humanism " had begun to split; with Grocin and Linacre, More and Colet, the humanistic movement, which in the persons of patrons like Gloucester, Tiptoft, and Bishop Grey was a series of isolated efforts, had become firmly established on the basis of original production. For English humanism in the fifteenth century was still overshadowed by the medieval tradition, and was regarded, as Dr Weiss points out, " not as a new cultural manifestation or a refinement in taste, but rather as a means of

improving some aspects of scholasticism." The main interest was still theology. This is shown clearly in men like Thomas Gascoigne and Thomas Chaundler. A knowledge of Greek was prized mainly for its help in philosophical and theological studies; there was no real study of Greek secular literature until the following century. This "utilitarian conception", as Dr Weiss calls it, of the humanities in England was not altogether a weakness. It can, indeed, be plausibly argued that the adoption of humanism as a means and not as an end was the real strength of the English movement, and bore remarkable fruit not merely in the work, as Dr Weiss admits, of Grocin, Colet, Linacre, and More, but in the balanced learning of Anglican theology in the succeeding centuries. Again to quote Dr Weiss, "the English learning of the eve of the Reformation included the best characteristics of humanism and scholasticism."

Particularly good is Dr Weiss' estimate of the contribution of Abbot John Whethamstede to the humanistic movement. He corrects Schirmer's too enthusiastic conception of the Abbot of St Albans as a pioneer of neo-classicism. His prose and his verse belong to the debased Latinity of the later medieval schools. He was fond of exercising his slender talent for versification. A typical example, which has not, so far as I am aware, been published, is the inscription on the brass in Wheathampstead Church which commemorates his father and his mother.

It is a pity that Dr Weiss's plan did not allow him to give some specimens of more competent versification from the *Lucubratiunculæ Tiburtinæ* of Robert Flemmyng, the only printed edition of which dates from about 1480. Flemmyng was a pupil of Guarino of Verona, and during his visits to Italy he captured the real flavour of Italian humanism.

The main value of Dr Weiss's admirable book lies in the fact that it is exactly what is wanted as a guide to future research. To say this is to praise it highly. Scholars will welcome the full and well-arranged bibliography. To it can now be added Prof. V. H. Galbraith's article on "John Seward and his Circle" in *Mediæval and Renaissance Studies*, i, 85 *ff.*

HARPENDEN. F. J. E. RABY.

THE DECLINE OF RELIGION. By Cecil P. Martin. George Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

This book can be understood only by remembering that it is essentially the expression of an individual point of view, with both the strength and weakness of such a statement. It is important that the preface should be read first as it makes clear that the author is aware of the dangers of misunderstanding and misinterpretation.

The book is well worth careful reading; mere skimming is worse than useless. There are few difficulties arising from the

impact of modern knowledge with obsolete religious prejudices which the author does not discuss with a candour which often disarms criticism of the dogmatic nature of his opinions. In the chapter on Science several important and discerning points are made. The assertion that, " in general, physicists are and always have been much less materialistic in their outlook on the universe than biologists " is well illustrated in the remainder of the paragraph. But the author has an unfortunate habit of making the illogical distinction between facts and " scientific facts ". We are told—" Science, therefore, is concerned with physical facts demonstrated by physical evidence ", and again—" they are not scientific facts, for we cannot objectively observe or measure them ". It is also implied that any fact which depends for its knowledge on " direct personal experience " or " the testimony of others " is outside the province of Science. If Dr Martin had read something of F. R. Tennant's analysis of " scientific knowledge " he might have realized the truth that any knowledge must rest upon a combination in some degree of direct personal experience and the testimony of others. (It would be interesting to see what he makes of eclipses.)

The chief criticism of the book is not that its outlook on Christianity is hopelessly dated to the nineteenth century, a fault which is only too common, but that its outlook on Science is correspondingly obsolete. The author apparently fails to realize in practice what he admits in theory—that the real conflict is not between Religion and Science, but between wrong-headed views of both.

The great flaw in the book, traced from the treatment of Science to that of the Church and the Bible, can be summed up by asserting that the word " catholic " has no meaning for the author. There is no real insight into the catholic nature of knowledge; the author carves it up and then complains of divisions. There is not a glimmer to show that the Catholic Church is known except as a corrupt distortion of the supposed purely individualist Church as Christ intended it. Sacraments find no mention except indirectly as mistakes on the part of the Apostles or as corruptions. And if we turn to the index, while we find it helpful on the subject of Zoroaster, or H. G. Wells, and even King Lear and the Origin of Species, there is no mention of Worship, Prayer, Conversion, Repentance, or Sacrament, to quote a few not unimportant subjects of a religious character.

The chapter on Ecclesiasticism shows the author at his worst. Although on page 96 we are rightly reminded that " the essence of their union [*sc.* with Christ] was inward and spiritual, the outward union was only an expression and realization of the inward one ", the rest of the chapter is a denial of any necessity for " realizing " this union at all in the way implied. We have also the silly well-worn gibe (pp. 101 and 106) about titles. As on his own title-page the author does not scruple to inform us that he is

a Master of Arts and Doctor of Science as well as a Professor of Anatomy, in his opinion sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander. One recollects that academic persons as well as corrupt ecclesiastics " favour gorgeous robes and distinctive attire ".

If the chapter on Ecclesiasticism is the one least worthy of the author's dignity and charity, his treatment of the Bible is the most inconsistent and extraordinary feature of the book. While in the chapter on the Bible the " higher " criticism is trounced with a vigour which might well mitigate the warmth of the welcome in Liberal Evangelical circles which the publishers claim on the dust cover, yet elsewhere the author does not hesitate to revise and reject as suits his own opinions. The extraordinary discussion on page 113 of the election of Matthias with the naïve remark that " it does not really matter if an occasional verse can be twisted into a seeming support " is a case in point. When he continues, " In interpreting these verses we shall construe them in the light of many *obvious* [reviewer's italics] cases in which Christ denounced the ecclesiasticism of His day ", we can only deduce that if any part of the New Testament does not agree with the author's point of view, so much the worse for the New Testament. In failing to see the inseparable connexion between the Bible and the Church, the author fails to do justice to either of them.

It is a great pity that such obvious blemishes should cloud so much that is good and instructive in this book. Perhaps the combination of Ireland and Canada is not the best preparation for a just estimate of Roman Catholicism, let alone Catholicism proper.

There are one or two misprints. On page 95, fifteen lines up, for " our " read " one ". The type and paper are both good.

CAMBRIDGE. C. D. WADDAMS.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ST LEO THE GREAT. By Trevor Jalland. S.P.C.K. for C.H.S. 21s.

Mr Jalland's book, the first modern account of Leo I on such a scale, will be welcomed by all serious students of the early Church, but the " general reader ", I fear, will find it difficult to digest.

Leo's work is described according to the spheres of his activity —the Roman diocese, the Roman province, the other western Churches, the vicariate of Illyricum, the eastern Church. Then come chapters on Leo as a preacher, an ethical teacher, and a theologian. The plan is admirable, but the resulting proportions are strange. Leo's work as a diocesan gets 20 pages, while his relations with the East cover 195; and even if we concede to Leo that Illyricum may rank as western, the western " patriarchate " gets only 140 pages. This is not the author's fault, for the historian of a remote period constantly finds that

the evidence has not survived in the proportions he would desire, and in this case accounts of the Christological controversies and the connected Councils are extant in great detail. Yet this controversy was in a sense accidental to Leo, while his administration of the west was normal. One loss is most regrettable. The popes, it is said, gained in power when Rome ceased to be the capital and its bishop became the chief resident authority. Yet how little we know of the facts. How far did Leo work with the Prefect, and did he intervene in civil administration? Had he any political theory, and what did he think of the *De Civitate Dei*? What Mr Jalland has collected on this subject amounts to very little.

Leo's papal claims and theories are carefully expounded. I am struck by Mr Jalland's insistence on his respect for canon law, and would have welcomed a more concentrated discussion of this point. A practical man like Leo would naturally insist on the observance of existing canon law when it served his purpose, but theoretically his papal claims are uneasily related to conciliar action, and it would be useful to assemble the evidence, here scattered, of his use of canons. What law did he respect? He still (deliberately?) muddled Nicæa and Sardica, though in 419 the African Church had compelled Rome to re-examine the Nicene Acta; he considered papal decretals binding, but disregarded the Council of Constantinople, and wanted to annul Chalcedon 28. In one instance, he bowed to the Alexandrian right to determine Easter, since he thought Nicæa prescribed it; but he tried to enforce Roman customs on provinces which had their own canon law.

On two points the author defends Leo against common criticism—namely, in his treatment of Hilary of Arles and in his Christology. I remain unconvinced. Not that Mr Jalland will never criticize his hero, but in my judgment his praise is pitched too high.

This book is based on a minute first-hand study of the evidence, and therefore has considerable value. It is likely to be for some time the standard English work on Leo. It contains so much detail and so many citations that absolute accuracy would be superhuman. But there ought not to be so many misprints (the most curious is a transposition on p. 74, line 2; on p. 81, read *Christum* for *Christium* and *Platonia* for *Platoma*), nor so many minor errors (*e.g.*, Arles 316, three times; Decius, 260; and the astounding reference (p. 256) to Aurelius as Bishop of Carthage in Cæsarea Mauretania, a double error repeated in the index).

If I advance a few more substantial criticisms, it is not without respect for Mr Jalland's great labour and usually careful scholarship.

1. The relation of ecclesiastical to secular areas of jurisdiction is not correctly stated (p. 21). An exarch corresponds to a civil

vicarius, not to a prefect, and no single patriarchate corresponds to a prefecture.

2. Leo is apparently given the credit for arrangements and ideas which in fact he took over from others. For example, the "wisdom and consideration" (p. 91) with which he applied Nicæa, can. 5, was already practised in Africa, where the single annual council was attended by delegates from the provinces in which it was not being held (C. Hippo, 393).

3. In his discussion of the vicariate of Illyricum, Mr Jalland is unfortunately ignorant of Silva-Tarouca's edition (1937) of the *Collectio Thessalonicensis*, from the original MS Vat. Lat. 5751, which is *not* lost (p. 505), though the Ballerini could not find it.

4. His knowledge of Manichæan studies appears to be quite out of date (p. 58). Much new material has been published since 1930. See the surveys in Pauly-Wissowa, Supp. VI (1935), and, by Allberry, in *J.T.S.*, 1938.

5. The note on Priscillianism is very weak. See D'Alès, *Priscillien*, 1936.

6. The bibliographies are useful, but not really good. The section on Architecture and Topography is strangely old-fashioned, and I have noticed weakness elsewhere on archæological points. The description of Rome is based on Grisar and Lanciani; and there have been many studies of San Sebastiano since Lietzmann. Reference to De Rossi's *Inscriptiones Christianæ* should now include its continuation by Silvagni; and I cannot but suspect that by Diehl, *Inscriptiones latinæ veteres*, Bonn, 1912, a book of facsimiles, he means Diehl's three volumes of Christian inscriptions, Berlin, 1925. Finally, it is surprising to find no mention of Schwartz's *Der Prozess des Eutyches*, Munich, 1929, and Silva-Tarouca's edition of the letters against Eutyches, Rome, 1935.

Oxford. S. L. Greenslade.

The Religious Opinions of Milton, Locke and Newton. By H. McLachlan. Manchester University Press. 7s. 6d.

The posthumous histories of Milton, Locke, and Newton have been strangely alike. All three, in their various ways, have had outstanding influence upon posterity. None of them is primarily remembered for his theology, although all three wrote upon theological questions. Each of them was for a long time generally regarded as orthodox in his fundamental religious opinions, but in each instance the publication of anti-Trinitarian writings suppressed in his lifetime led to controversy which has apparently not yet entirely subsided, although the champions of orthodoxy seem in the last hundred years to have been fighting a rearguard action. My own studies in the seventeenth century have been principally concerned with the literary aspects of Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism, so that I write

here only from the standpoint of " the common reader "; but it seems clear from his carefully documented little book that Dr McLachlan (who is Principal of the Unitarian College, Manchester) is quite justified in claiming these three illustrious Englishmen as having been Unitarians of some sort during the greater part of their adult lives. Locke and Newton lived and died in communion with the Established Church, but they are not the only heretics to have achieved this degree of accommodation.

Dr McLachlan's work is historical rather than theological. He presents facts of biography and bibliography which seem to establish his position, and very fairly refutes the various biographers and controversialists who have tried to enrol his heroes in the orthodox camp. His knowledge of Unitarian history is minutely detailed, and specialists cannot afford to neglect his relation of Milton, Locke, and Newton to the background of the great Trinitarian controversy. The more general reader, however, may be disappointed that there is little theological discussion, and may find the theological and cultural standpoint surprisingly naive. We must always be grateful to the early Unitarians for their pioneer work in biblical criticism, for their faith in human reason, and their advocacy of religious freedom and toleration. But we have lately seen biblical criticism run mad, the exaggerated respect for human reason sunk into a complete denial of its efficacy, and religious freedom rapidly degenerating into freedom from religion. These are remoter consequences of the rationalism of the age of Milton, Locke, and Newton; they derive from its abstractive habit of treating as " real " only those elements of experience with which the human reason can cope in isolation. Milton's language was not the spoken language of the day, and posterity inherited mainly through him a specialized " poetic diction " which isolated the poetic experience from the common experience of mankind; Locke rationally based society upon property, so that Whiggism never had a social ethic; whilst Newtonian mechanics, however practically fruitful, fathered the " scientific materialism " of later generations. There is no hint of all this in Dr McLachlan, who seems unaware that the values of Whig history have been challenged by criticism of more intellectual potency than that of " aggressive totalitarian Powers on the Continent ".

The book is not very well written, and its production must have suffered from war conditions. There are two misprints in the quotation on p. 10: " forewill " should read " free will "; and " had ", " and "; on p. 102 the bracket should come after " Aaron "; and the poet on p. 193 should of course be " Spenser ", not " Spencer ".

CARDIFF. S. L. BETHELL.

Printed in Great Britain by
Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher